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Driverless Finance 
Hilary J. Allen1 
Forthcoming, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. __ 
While safety concerns are at the forefront of the debate about driverless 
cars, such concerns seem to be less salient when it comes to the increasingly 
sophisticated algorithms driving the financial system. This Article argues, 
however, that a precautionary approach to sophisticated financial 
algorithms is justified by the potential enormity of the social costs of 
financial collapse.  Using the algorithm-driven fintech business models of 
robo-investing, marketplace lending, high frequency trading and token 
offerings as case studies, this Article illustrates how increasingly 
sophisticated algorithms (particularly those capable of machine learning) 
can exponentially exacerbate complexity, speed and correlation within the 
financial system, rendering the system more fragile.  This Article also 
explores how such algorithms may undermine some of the regulatory 
reforms implemented in the wake of the Financial Crisis to make the 
financial system more robust.  Through its analysis, this Article 
demonstrates that the algorithmic automation of finance (a phenomenon I 
refer to as “driverless finance”) deserves close attention from a financial 
stability perspective.  This Article argues that regulators should become 
involved with the processes by which the relevant algorithms are being 
created, and that such efforts should begin immediately – while the 
technology is still in its infancy and remains somewhat susceptible to 
regulatory influence.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
Precautionary concerns are at the forefront of the debate about 
driverless cars: before control over autonomous vehicles is fully handed 
over to computer algorithms, extensive testing is being undertaken to ensure 
the safety of passengers, other drivers and pedestrians.2  Safety concerns 
figure much less prominently, however, in discussions about fintech and the 
increasing algorithmic automation of finance; this Article seeks to make 
these discussions more complete by considering how the increased 
prominence of algorithms could undermine financial stability. Although 
risks of economic failure may not be as viscerally salient as threats of injury 
caused by a rogue driverless car, prior financial crises have had devastating 
impacts on society – widespread increases in unemployment, poverty and 
crime have indirectly impacted physical and mental health, and even led to 
premature deaths.3  This Article therefore argues that a precautionary stance 
is also justified with regard to what I have termed “driverless finance”, and 
the potential impact of increasingly driverless finance on financial stability.   
“Financial stability” denotes a state of affairs where financial 
institutions and markets are functioning well and robust to shocks, such that 
they can continue to provide the capital intermediation, risk management 
and payment services on which broader economic growth depends.4  
Financial stability regulation is an essentially precautionary exercise, in the 
sense that it errs on the side of avoiding the harm to the broader economy 
that can be caused by institutional and market failure, even though such 
harms cannot be precisely predicted or quantified.5  Effective financial 
stability regulation requires a broadening of regulatory focus to encompass 
new innovations and business models as and when they arise – including the 
latest generation of financial algorithms.  While the use of algorithms in 
finance is nothing new (an algorithm is ultimately just a set of instructions 
executed by a computer),6 the ubiquity, sophistication and autonomy of 
financial algorithms has increased significantly in recent years with 
2 For discussions of the regulation of driverless cars, see Jack Stilgoe, Machine Learning, 
Social Learning and the Governance of Self-Driving Cars, 2 (2017) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937316); David C. Vladeck, Machines 
Without Principals: Liability Rule and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 120 
(2014); Michael Mattioli, Autonomy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 227 (2018).   
3 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 1087, 1095-7 (2015). 
4 Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in 
International Financial Regulation, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L 929, 932 (2014).   
5 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
173, 178 (2013). 
6 Andrew Tutt, An FDA For Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 92 (2017). 
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advances in computing power and data usage techniques.7 High frequency 
trading algorithms now execute their trades at speeds impervious to human 
judgment and interference.8  In marketplace lending business models, 
judgment calls about screening and rating potential borrowers have been 
almost entirely delegated to algorithms.9  Robo-investing business models 
similarly delegate the selection and ongoing assessment of investment 
portfolios.10  Algorithms are also integral to tokens hosted on blockchain 
networks and sold in “initial coin offerings” – here, the very product being 
offered to investors is a type of algorithm known as a smart contract, and 
transactions are designed to be self-executing and insulated from human 
intervention.11  This Article will explore the implications for financial 
stability of this unprecedented level of algorithmic autonomy in the financial 
system – autonomy that will only increase with technological advances in 
machine learning.12   
Of course, there are natural limitations on any contemporaneous 
assessment of the impact of increasingly automated algorithms on financial 
stability.  Many of the fintech business models that rely heavily on 
algorithms have not yet scaled up to a size where they are likely to have a 
significant impact on the financial system as a whole, or the broader 
economy.13  Furthermore, none of these fintech business models have yet to 
be tested in a crisis or contracting economy, so we cannot learn from actual 
instances of failure.14  That does not mean that this Article’s examination is 
too premature: innovation can move from “‘too small to care’ to ‘too big to 
fail’ (systemically important) in very short periods of time.”15  While it may 
be tempting to defer consideration of the systemic impact of automated 
7 Financial Stability Board, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING 
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY IMPLICATIONS, 8 (Nov. 1, 2017) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P011117.pdf ) (hereinafter, “FSB AI Report”) (discussing the technological 
developments that have facilitated the latest wave of financial technology). 
8 See Section III.C, infra. 
9 See Section III.B, infra. 
10 See Section III.A, infra. 
11 See Section III.D, infra. 
12 Machine learning will be discussed more fully in Section II, infra.  Algorithms capable of 
machine learning are programmed not to perform a particular task, but to draw lessons from 
a data set about how to perform tasks in the future. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and 
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014). 
13 The FSB (an international group of regulators responsible for setting the international 
agenda on financial stability issues) recently concluded that “there are currently no 
compelling financial stability risks from emerging FinTech innovations.” Financial Stability 
Board, FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH: SUPERVISORY 
AND REGULATORY ISUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION, 1 (Jun. 27, 
2017) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf) (hereinafter, 
“FSB Fintech Report”). 
14 Id. 
15 Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial 
Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 404 (2017).  
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financial decision-making until after we have observed a failure of that 
technology, the costs of systemic impact may be significant, and ex post 
measures tend to be limited in their ability to contain the fall-out from 
crises.16  The potential for serious economic harm (and attendant social 
costs) necessitates creative thinking about the risks that financial institutions 
and activities could create, and proposals for regulation to address those 
risks ex ante.17   
It is therefore troubling that the Treasury Department’s recent report 
on “Nonbank Financials, Fintech and Innovation” makes almost no mention 
of the impact that machine learning, smart contracts, and other technological 
innovations could have on financial stability.18  Machine learning and smart 
contracts are currently in their infancy, but there will soon come an 
inflection point after which financial regulators will be circumscribed in 
their ability to influence the application of such technology in the financial 
markets. Policymakers should therefore be thinking now about the potential 
impact of “driverless finance” on financial stability, and the broader 
economy.  This Article seeks to kickstart this debate by exploring how 
financial stability may be undermined by driverless finance’s increased 
speed and complexity, as well as the propensity for increased delegation of 
decision-making to a few algorithms to lead to destabilizing correlation (a 
phenomenon this article will refer to as “correlation by algorithm”). This 
Article will also explore how increased use of algorithms could undercut 
existing financial stability regulation, including regulatory attempts to 
inculcate a more stability-oriented financial culture in financial institutions.  
This Article will then consider possible precautionary responses to 
the threats to financial stability that have been identified.  While regulators 
should not require conclusive proof of the safety of financial algorithms 
(something that is probably not feasible in any event), they should regulate 
the processes by which sophisticated financial algorithms are created.  
“Correlation by algorithm”, for example, is likely to prove a challenging 
phenomenon to address, but regulators could adopt principles-based 
regulation that requires that all financial algorithms at least contemplate in 
some way the possibility of low-probability but high-consequence events – 
the type of events that precipitate financial crises.  In order to slow down 
individual transactions and preserve flexibility in a tightly coupled system, 
regulators could require that smart contracts embedded in financial assets 
include some form of circuit breaker, and be hosted on a distributed ledger 
16 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 1087, 1104 (2015). 
17 The FSB has highlighted the need to think broadly about risks to financial stability posed 
by the various fintech business models, individually and in concert.  FSB Fintech Report, 
supra Note 13 at 2-3. 
18 U.S. Department of the Treasury, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND 
INNOVATION (Jul. 31, 2018) (the “Treasury Report”). 
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maintained by identifiable nodes with the power to undo erroneous 
transactions.  More generally, requiring preapproval of financial algorithms 
before they can be utilized could at least slow the financial system’s 
inexorable march towards mystifying complexity.19  There is also a place for 
precaution in regulators’ ongoing supervision of firms, ensuring that those 
firms have the necessary internal governance structures to oversee their 
usage of automated algorithms, and make changes and corrections when 
risks become apparent. 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  First, Section 
II will make the normative argument for why a precautionary, financial 
stability-oriented approach to regulating “driverless finance” should be 
embraced, drawing analogies from the literature on autonomous vehicles. 
Section III will then introduce the most algorithm-dependent fintech 
business models, which will be used as examples in Section IV.  Section IV 
illustrates how increasingly sophisticated algorithms can exponentially 
exacerbate complexity, speed and correlation within the financial system, 
rendering the system more fragile. Section IV also considers how the latest 
algorithms may undermine the regulatory reforms that were implemented in 
the wake of the Financial Crisis to make the financial system more robust.  
Section V offers some preliminary recommendations for how regulators 
should implement a precautionary approach to driverless finance, focusing 
on the process by which algorithms are created.  The Article concludes on a 
note of optimism, briefly hypothesizing a best-case scenario where a 
precautionary approach results in algorithms that enhance financial stability. 
II. A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO SOPHISTICATED ALGORITHMS
Laws designed to address a world of primarily human actors are 
being strained by 21st century technological innovations that subvert this 
paradigm.20  Decision-making is increasingly being delegated to algorithms, 
and the algorithms themselves are becoming increasingly sophisticated in 
their decision-making.  While simpler algorithms can only act in ways 
dictated by their programmers,21 others are now being programmed to draw 
their own decision-making rules from exposure to voluminous data sets22  – 
a phenomenon known as machine learning.23  Driverless cars, for example, 
will be guided by machine learning algorithms that have been trained using 
vast proprietary data sets captured by driving around highways and cities (a 
19 Such approval would not require conclusive proof of a financial product’s safety.  See 
Note 264 and accompanying text.  
20 Jack Stilgoe, Machine Learning, Social Learning and the Governance of Self-Driving 
Cars, 2 (2017) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937316). 
21 David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rule and Artificial 
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 120 (2014). 
22 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 8. 
23 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014). 
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phenomenon referred to as “fleet learning”).24  These algorithms draw 
patterns from data to allow them to make sense of the world outside of the 
vehicle, and to make decisions about how to react to observed stimuli when 
driving.25  Many financial firms currently use much simpler, more predictive 
algorithms in their businesses, but as time goes on one can reasonably 
expect that financial business models will become increasingly reliant on 
machine learning algorithms that draw patterns from selected data sets.26 
Financial regulators face significant challenges engaging even with 
predictive algorithms27 – machine learning algorithms will pose even greater 
challenges for regulators trying to maintain the safety of the financial 
system.  
Discussing regulatory challenges associated with machine learning 
generally, Tutt has identified two broad categories of difficulty: difficulty 
predicting algorithmic output (in other words, how they will react in a given 
set of circumstances), and difficulty explaining why an algorithm acted in a 
particular way after the fact.28  To illustrate in the context of driverless cars, 
the most obvious differences between human and algorithmic decision-
making manifest in what are known as “edge cases” – “scenarios that cars 
seldom encounter, and might be unable to handle without specific 
training.”29  Here, it is quite possible that the algorithm will make sense of 
the world and react in a very different way to a human; it is very hard to 
predict how the algorithm will direct the vehicle to react in these edge cases, 
and if something does go wrong, it can be very difficult after the fact to 
unearth why the algorithm made the decision it did.30  In finance, decision-
making by machine learning algorithms has the potential to be similarly 
fraught. Such algorithms do not understand financial markets in the same 
way that humans do: humans tend to rely on narratives to make sense of the 
world, whereas algorithms tend to focus on statistical data points.31  It is true 
that advances in semantic research may make algorithms more adept at 
mirroring human understanding at some point,32 but for the foreseeable 
future, algorithms are likely to be hampered in their ability to see the big 
24 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 19 
25 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 85-86. 
26 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 33 (“Most market participants expect that AI and 
machine learning will be adopted further”). 
27 See, for example Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and 
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing the difficulties that 
regulators face in engaging with computer risk models); Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as 
Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715 (2018) (discussing the difficulties that 
regulators face in engaging with high frequency trading algorithms). 
28 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 101. 
29 Michael Mattioli, Autonomy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 227, 295 (2018).   
30 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 101. 
31 Andrew G. Haldane, Will Big Data Keep Its Promise?, Speech at Data Analytics for 
Finance and Macro Research Centre, King’s Business School (Apr. 19, 2018). 
32 Id. 
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picture in the way that humans do.33  The unpredictability of algorithmic 
decision-making in unusual circumstances should set off alarm bells for 
regulators charged with promoting the safety and stability of the financial 
system. 
Concerns about safety are certainly at the forefront of debates about 
the algorithms driving autonomous vehicles.34  In 2017, the House passed 
legislation known as the “Safely Ensuring Lives Future Development 
Research in Vehicle Evolution Act”, and a similar bill (titled the “American 
Vision for Safer Transportation Through Advancement of Revolutionary 
Technologies Act”) is pending in the Senate.  One observer has described 
autonomous vehicles as having hit a “legislative sweet spot”, in that there is 
lucrative commercial potential for a technology that promises to make 
transportation substantially safer.35 Although policymakers are grappling 
with the question of “How safe is safe enough”? when it comes to 
autonomous vehicles,36 the general societal consensus seems to be that some 
degree of precaution with respect to driverless cars is appropriate.   
By precaution, I mean that policies should err on the side of avoiding 
significant harm, notwithstanding uncertainty about the nature of such harm, 
and the probability of it occurring.37  The form of precaution that I advocate 
does not require that an activity be proven riskless before it can proceed – it 
does, however, create a presumption that the benefits of precautionary 
regulation outweigh the associated costs, notwithstanding that the benefits 
may be difficult (if not impossible) to quantify.38  Ultimately, decisions 
about the degree of precaution to be deployed are value-laden ones, 
reflecting cultural attitudes towards risks and the costs of protecting against 
them.  The United States is often characterized as being particularly 
skeptical of precautionary regulatory regimes, choosing to privilege the 
promotion of innovation over protection from the risks that such innovation 
may create.39  Even in the context of driverless cars, Stilgoe argues that 
33 Mattioli, supra Note 29 at 285 
34 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 40. Algorithms controlling the availability of electricity, and the 
provision of medical care, have similarly been identified as capable of “inflicting unusually 
grave harm”, and thus the debate about them revolves around safety concerns. Tutt, supra 
Note 6 at 117. 
35 Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles, 53 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 337, 339 (2018). 
36 Mattioli, supra Note 29 at 296 
37 Allen, supra Note 5 at 191. 
38 Id. at 197-8. 
39 “According to prevalent stereotypes today, Americans are said to be individualistic, 
technologically optimistic, forward-looking, risk-taking, and antiregulatory, confident that 
new technology and the power of markets will solve every problem and that precaution is a 
waste of time and a hindrance to progress.” Jonathan B. Wiener,  The Rhetoric of 
Precaution in Jonathan B. Wiener et al. (Eds), THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: 
COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, 7 
(2011). 
8 Hilary J. Allen 
regulation may ultimately be less precautionary than desirable because 
“concerns about liberty are relatively elevated over public safety” in the 
United States.40  While the United States does not always reject 
precautionary approaches to regulation (the precautionary anti-terrorist 
measures taken by the United States since September 11 are evidence of 
this),41 antipathy for precautionary regulation is likely to manifest itself in 
the context of financial stability regulation, where harms resulting from 
economic failure tend to be less salient than harms to life and limb42 
(perhaps for similar reasons, regulatory approaches to disembodied software 
have also tended to be relatively technical and unconcerned with value 
judgments about risks).43   
There is almost no discussion of financial stability in the latest 
Treasury Report on fintech innovations, which instead enthusiastically 
embraces technological developments and market solutions,44 and seeking to 
implement precautionary financial stability regulation with respect to 
financial algorithms is likely to face significant political challenges. As I 
have argued previously, however, a precautionary approach to financial 
stability regulation should be pursued notwithstanding the political 
challenges.45  The fallout from financial crises may sometimes seem 
abstract, but it can include very real deteriorations in mental and physical 
health, as well as economic problems like significant reductions in personal 
wealth and unemployment.46  Purely ex post regulatory measures are limited 
in their ability to contain the fall-out from systemic failures,47 and such 
measures may also have significant unforeseen economic consequences (for 
example, the extended period of low interest rates that followed the 
Financial Crisis incentivized investment in riskier assets in a search for 
yield, potentially sowing the seeds of future financial instability).48  
Financial system failure may also have undesirable political consequences: a 
decade after the Financial Crisis, Gordon has remarked that “The actions 
40 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 41.   
41 Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction in 
Jonathan B. Wiener et al. (Eds), THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, 286 (2011). 
42 Allen, supra Note 5 at 194.  See also Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Commission, 
A PROPOSED MODEL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK, 2 (Jan. 2018) (“The impact on an individual of an autonomous decision in, 
for example, medical diagnosis will be greater than in processing a bank loan.”) 
43 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 35. 
44 Treasury Report, supra Note 18. 
45 Allen, supra Note 5.  In a recent book chapter, Gordon has also made the case for a 
precautionary approach to financial stability regulation.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Dynamic 
Precaution’ in Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in O’Halloran & 
Groll (eds) TEN YEARS AFTER THE CRASH (forthcoming). 
46 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 1087, 1095-7 (2015). 
47 Id. at 1104. 
48 Id. at 1105.   
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that were necessary to save the financial system from collapse (and to avoid 
an even worse economic and human outcome) produced a pattern of winners 
and losers that could not be defended on any principle of desert”, setting the 
stage for the current rise of populism around the world.49 
Where financial innovation has the potential to generate significantly 
catastrophic externalities for society at large, taking a “wait-and-see” 
approach to regulation is inadequate; it is foolhardy to wait to see the 
systemic damage that increasingly autonomous financial algorithms might 
inflict before starting to consider their potential impact, even if it is hard to 
predict precisely what that impact will be.  Business models like 
marketplace lending and robo-investing aim to serve important niches of the 
economy that are underserved by the traditional financial system. If such 
business models fail after gaining significant market share, there may not be 
any substitutes for their services, and the real economy may suffer.  In 
addition, larger established financial institutions that are integral to the 
proper functioning of the broader economy are increasingly adopting 
algorithmic approaches to their core businesses in an attempt to remain 
competitive.50  These institutions may also decide to invest in ICOs and 
other offerings of fintech firms, providing yet another conduit for issues 
with algorithmic finance to impact the more established financial system, 
and the economy at large.  This Article therefore argues that regulators 
should engage in early-stage dialogue with the creators of these new 
technologies – a precautionary approach to reviewing a technology 
considers the process by which it is created, instead of restricting regulatory 
oversight to the finished product.51   
In this venture, time is of the essence.  Although there are many who 
take the view that regulators should defer regulating fintech until after a 
market failure has occurred and the pitfalls of a fintech business model have 
been laid bare by experience,52 once the market for a particular financial 
product or service becomes well-established, opportunity for regulatory 
intervention becomes limited.53  This narrowing of opportunity is partly a 
result of political economy: an established industry will have more clout to 
resist regulation and regulators are often loath to upset market expectations 
49 Gordon, supra Note 45 at __. 
50 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 9, 30.  The Treasury Department reports that “Firms 
expect that the effective use of AI, machine learning and big data analysis will be a key 
source of competitive advantage, which is spurring investment and competition.” Treasury 
Report, supra Note 18 at 56.  Established institutions might also use the existence of fintech 
competitors as justification for lobbying for lighter touch regulation.  Gordon, supra Note 
45 at [8].
51 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 10. 
52 See, for example, Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis 
Paradigm, 47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1271, 1308-9 (2016). 
53 Allen, supra Note 5 at 223. 
10 Hilary J. Allen 
about the regulatory treatment of an established product or service.54 It is 
also an issue of technology, though – it is far more difficult to alter the 
workings of a technology once it is operational than it is to help shape it 
during development.55  Machine learning and smart contracts, as applied to 
finance, are in their infancy.  If regulators miss this window of opportunity, 
the technology of “driverless finance” may become inscrutable and largely 
unregulatable – but any problems that it creates for financial stability and 
the broader economy will still be borne by society as a whole.56  
III. ALGORITHM-DRIVEN FINTECH BUSINESS MODELS
Increased use of algorithms is permeating all aspects of finance,57 
but nowhere is this trend more apparent than in several new fintech business 
models. By way of background, “fintech” is an umbrella term that is 
generally understood to encompass mobile payment services, robo-
investing, marketplace lending (otherwise known as P2P lending), 
crowdfunding, virtual currencies, and tokens sold in initial coin offerings. 58  
Some scholars also include high frequency trading in their discussions of 
fintech products and services.59  Notwithstanding their grouping together as 
“fintech”, though, these business models are very diverse.  Importantly for 
this Article, some are much more reliant on algorithms than others.  Because 
sophisticated algorithms are integral to the robo-investing, marketplace 
lending, high frequency trading, and token business models, this Article will 
use them as examples as it considers the financial stability implications of 
increased reliance on sophisticated algorithms.  This Section will provide a 
brief introduction to these business models. 
A. Robo-Investing 
The term “robo-advisor” is popularly used to describe “an automated 
investment service…which competes with financial advisors by claiming to 
54 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841, 1850 (2011); Kenneth C. Kettering, 
Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1651 (2008). 
55 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 10. 
56 As Omarova has argued, “[u]nless the public side proactively counters new technologies’ 
potentially destabilizing systemic effects, it may soon find itself in an impossible position 
of having to back up an uncontrollable and unsustainably self-referential financial system.” 
Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE 
J. REG. __, [58] (2019). 
57 For a survey of many of the existing applications of machine learning in finance, see FSB 
AI Report, supra Note 7.  
58 GAO, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, 1 (2017).  
59 See, for example, Arner et al., Supra Note 52 at 1291-92; Thomas Philippon, The Fintech 
Opportunity, 2 (July 2016) (available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/FinTech.pdf). 
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offer equally good (if not better) advice and service at a lower price”,60 and 
while robo-advisory services are being developed for banking and insurance 
products as well as securities,61 this Article will focus on the more 
developed sector of “robo-investing” in securities.  Broadly speaking, this 
industry uses algorithms to provide automated “customer profiling, asset 
allocation, portfolio selection, trade execution, portfolio rebalancing, tax-
loss harvesting and portfolio analysis”.62  Different firms provide robo-
investing services in different ways, but most robo-investing models tout 
their potential to democratize investing by providing low-cost financial 
advice to customers who may only have small amounts of capital.63  Robo-
investing algorithms may also be more competent than human financial 
advisers,64 as well as avoid the conflicts of interests that plague them 
(depending on how the selection algorithm is designed).65  While many 
robo-investing platforms currently use predictive algorithms, there is 
enormous interest in applying machine learning techniques to collect 
information about clients’ financial circumstances and improve portfolio 
selection.66   
The SEC has noted that most robo-investing services start their 
relationship with the investor by utilizing an online questionnaire to assess 
an investor’s financial situation and risk tolerance.67  The subsequent 
relationship between robo-investing firm and investor then varies by 
business model.  Some robo-investing firms “are essentially automated 
interfaces that offer investment advice and discretionary investment 
management services without the intervention of a human adviser, using 
algorithms and asset allocation models that are advertised as being tailored 
to each individual's investment needs.”68  Other robo-investing services may 
be designed to provide information to a human intermediary who will 
ultimately interface with the customer and provide a more comprehensive 
60 Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial 
Services Industry, 7 (available at at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932189). 
61 Id. at 9. 
62 FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, 2 (available at 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf). 
63 Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at 1. 
64 “[A] large body of research in diverse fields demonstrates that even simple algorithms 
regularly outperform humans in the kinds of tasks that robo advisors perform”.  Id. at 3.   
65 Id. at 19. 
66 See, for example, Deloitte, THE NEXT FRONTIER: THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED 
FINANCIAL ADVICE IN THE UK, 22 (available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-
uk-updated-robo-advice-new-horizons-layout-mww8.pdf). 
67 Securities Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisors (Feb. 23, 2017) 
(available at https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-
bulletins/investor-bulletin-robo-advisers). 
68 Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, 
Intermediation and Markets: Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. 
POL’Y 55, 88 2016. 
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set of financial planning services.69  Others, like Betterment,70 strike a 
middle ground by offering an automated interface with the option of 
receiving additional advice from financial professionals.71  All of these types 
of businesses are likely to be subject to the same investor protection 
regulations that non-automated financial advisors face.72  In the United 
States, this means that robo-investing firms are likely to be required to 
register as either investment advisers or broker/dealers.  For example, 
Betterment has registered with the SEC as an investment adviser, and also 
has a subsidiary broker-dealer registered with FINRA.73  
B. Marketplace Lending 
When fintech lending models first rose to prominence in the wake of 
the Financial Crisis, they hyped the “peer-to-peer” aspect of their process: 
the model sought to arrange funding for non-traditional borrowers from non-
traditional lenders by capitalizing on users’ sense of online community.74  In 
recent years, however, there has ceased to be much real sense of community 
or personal connection between borrower and lender.  Now, a prospective 
borrower requests a loan using a secure online platform (provided by a firm 
like Prosper or LendingClub), and then that platform utilizes a proprietary 
algorithm to make an initial approval decision, based on information 
gathered from the prospective borrower and other sources.75  If the 
prospective borrower meets the necessary criteria, then the lender platform 
will depersonalize the information it has about the prospective borrower and 
send the information (including an interest rate for the customer) out to 
prospective investors.76  If sufficient investors are interested in funding the 
loan, the loan will be made, and the lender platform will process repayments 
69 Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at 26.  FINRA uses slightly different terminology, 
excluding “financial professional-facing tools” from its definition of “robos”.  FINRA, 
supra Note 62 at 2. 
70 https://www.betterment.com/financial-experts/ 
71 FINRA, supra Note 62 at 3. 
72 Such regulation is likely to take the form of “licensing and education requirements 
designed to ensure that an intermediary has at least a minimum level of competence 
regarding the products that the intermediary is licensed to sell; disclosure requirements and 
antifraud rules that require intermediaries to be honest with their customers; and standards 
of conduct, such as the fiduciary standard, designed to encourage intermediaries to match 
their customers with suitable financial services.” Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at 11. 
73 Athwal Nav Athwal, Fintech Startups Navigate Legal Gray Areas To Build Billion-
Dollar Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2015). 
74 Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer 
Lending and Kickstarter, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 604 (2015). 
75 John L. Douglas, New Wine Into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 
20 N.C. BANK. INST. 17, 27 (2016).  It is possible that such data may be gleaned from 
non-traditional sources like “social media, public records (property transactions, births, 
deaths, marriage, divorce, criminal and civil legal matters, and the like), GPS and satellite 
tracking, and cameras.” Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, 18 FINTECH LAW 
REPORT 1, 5 (2015).  
76 Douglas, supra Note 75 at 27. 
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and provide administrative services in connection with the loan.77  These 
loans are often unsecured,78 and are typically for amounts under $50,000 for 
small businesses and around $10,000 for individual consumers.79 As such 
lending has become increasingly popular, the vast majority of the funds 
loaned have come from large institutional investors – resulting in a shift in 
terminology from “P2P lending” to “marketplace lending”.80   
Algorithms are central to the business case for marketplace lending: 
they enable platforms to screen and rate would-be borrowers in a way that is 
quicker and less resource-intensive than a traditional bank credit 
assessment.81 Increasingly, machine learning algorithms are also enabling 
marketplace lending platforms to expand the pool of borrowers they deem 
creditworthy.82  Using such algorithms, platforms can quickly collate and 
synthesize voluminous amounts of data about the applicant from non-
traditional sources, allowing for a more complete portrait of the credit 
applicant83 – the time it would take a human to perform a similar check of 
77 Id.  The legal structure underlying the business models of the Prosper and LendingClub 
platforms is somewhat complicated.  The loan is not actually made by the platform, but by 
an established financial institution with which the platform has a relationship.  The platform 
then purchases the loan from the financial institution, using funds provided by the investors. 
While an investor’s right to repayment is tied to the receipt of repayments from the ultimate 
borrowers, it takes the legal form of an unsecured note issued by the lending platform. 
Judge, supra Note 74 at 619.  See also Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating 
Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving 
Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 493 (2012). 
This structure implicates the securities laws, requiring lending platforms to register the 
issuance of the notes and make attendant disclosures in an attempt to protect investors – 
indeed, LendingClub had to suspend business in 2008 in order to bring itself into 
compliance with these laws.  Douglas, supra Note 75 at 38.  Nav Athwal, Fintech Startups 
Navigate Legal Gray Areas To Build Billion-Dollar Companies, TechCrunch (Apr. 19, 
2015). 
78 Eleanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowd-funding: An Infant Industry Growing Fast, Staff 
Working Paper of the IOSCO Research Department 3/2014, 37 (2014).  
79 Deloitte, MARKETPLACE LENDING 2.0: BRINGING ON THE NEXT STAGE IN 
LENDING, 7 (2017) (available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-
markeplace-lending2.pdf). 
80 Lalita Clozel, Could Online Lending Become the Next Systemic Risk?, AM. BANKER 
(Oct. 13, 2017); Judge, supra Note 74 at 613. 
81 “These lending platforms allow borrowers to have their loans approved faster and funds 
dispersed quicker than if the borrower sought a loan from a traditional bank.” Douglas, 
supra Note 75 at 27. 
82 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 12. 
83 “While it is not known exactly what specific set of alternative data are used by each of 
the specific fintech lenders, some have mentioned information drawn from bank account 
transactions such as utility or rent payments, other recurring transactions, and electronic 
records of deposit and withdrawal transaction.  Other items mentioned include insurance 
claims, credit card transactions, consumer’s occupation or details about their education, 
their use of mobile phones and related activities, Internet footprints, online shopping habit, 
investment choice, and so on.” Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemiux, The Roles of 
Alternative Data and Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the 
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such resources would likely be prohibitive.  Pasquale and others have raised 
important concerns about such machine learning algorithms violating 
privacy and exacerbating discrimination in the provision of credit, but such 
concerns are beyond the scope of this Article.84  Instead, our focus is on 
financial stability concerns, so the ability of machine learning algorithms to 
accurately predict creditworthiness, and accurately reflect creditworthiness 
in the interest rate to be charged, is more relevant.  
C. High Frequency Trading 
High frequency trading is sometimes treated as separate from other 
fintech business models, because it is not a consumer-facing product or 
service.  Nevertheless, it is a relatively new financial phenomenon that is 
highly dependent on algorithms and thus is an appropriate focus of any 
discussion of “driverless finance”. High frequency trading of financial assets 
is accomplished by algorithms deploying “fully automated trading strategies 
with very high trading volume and extremely short holding periods ranging 
from milliseconds to minutes”.85  There are a multiplicity of different high 
frequency trading strategies, but one widely-shared characteristic is “[t]he 
strong focus on speed of execution and portfolio turnover”; humans cannot 
trade quickly enough to profit from this type of strategy – trading decisions 
must be delegated to algorithms.86  Many high frequency trading firms also 
use algorithms to help identify and evaluate trading opportunities, as well as 
executing them.87  When markets are functioning normally, increased high 
frequency trading correlates with lowered costs, greater speed, improved 
market efficiency and increased liquidity for other traders in the markets.88 
These benefits (particularly the increased liquidity) tend to disappear when 
markets go haywire, however.89  High frequency trading has been 
implicated in many of the last decade’s market glitches:90 the 2010 Flash 
Crash remains the most significant of these, but there was also a treasury 
LendingClub Consumer Platform, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 
18/15, 2-3 (2018) (available at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-
data/publications/working-papers/2018/wp18-15r.pdf).  
84 Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
85 X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility and Price Discovery, 1 (Dec, 
2010) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691679). 
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Id. at 22-23. 
88 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND 
POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS, 16 (2015); Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND 
EFFICIENCY: FINAL REPORT, 10 (Oct. 2011) 
89 Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: 
Sense and Nonsense 65 DUKE L. J. 191, 248 (2015). 
90 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715, 738 
(2018). 
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flash crash in October of 2014,91 and a number of so-called “mini flash 
crashes”, where “[i]ndividual stocks [including Walmart and Google] at 
times gyrate[d] wildly within fractions of a second, only to reset moments 
later.”92  
To a large extent, high frequency trading algorithms are predictive, 
programmed by the so-called “quants”.  While there are efforts afoot to use 
more sophisticated machine learning algorithms to make trading decisions, 
these face major hurdles.  To facilitate autonomous algorithmic trading, 
significant (human) manpower would need to be continually deployed in 
defining the borders and granularity of the data set for the algorithms to 
learn from, and human judgment would have to be exercised as to which 
“noise” signals to eliminate from the data set.93  If the algorithm is restricted 
to a historical data set, then that may not be predictive of the future, but if 
the algorithm is constantly learning from market movements in real-time, 
then that may slow down the algorithm to the point that it is unable to 
complete with leaner, faster, predictive high frequency trading algorithms.94  
In the future, however, technological advances may render high frequency 
trading by machine learning algorithms more feasible – it is impossible to 
predict how such algorithms would react in the event of future market 
glitches.   
D. Tokens and other “Smart Assets” 
This Section will conclude with a discussion of token-related 
business models: when tokens are sold, in many respects, the algorithm is 
the asset.  A token is “nothing more than an entry in a ledger that specifies 
that a particular user… is the sole party able to exercise a discrete set of 
powers associated with the ledger entry.”95  Those powers are established by 
“smart contracts”, algorithms of varying degrees of sophistication that 
govern the functionality of the asset sold and that are intended to be self-
executing and self-enforcing96 – in other words, the contract is not supposed 
91 Matt Levine, Algorithms Had Themselves a Treasury Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 
13, 2015). 
92 Kara M. Stein, Remarks before Trader Forum 2014 Equity Trading Summit (Feb. 6, 
2014) (available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540761194). 
93 Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and 
High Frequency Trading, 20 (2013) (available at 
https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/papers/KearnsNevmyvakaHFTRiskBooks.pdf). 
94 Paul Golden, FX: Machine Learning Use Grows, But Lags in HFT , EUROMONEY 
(Aug. 2, 2018) (available at https://www.euromoney.com/article/b19b36yppj92q5/fx-
machine-learning-use-grows-but-lags-in-hft). 
95 Shaanan Cohney et. al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 12 (2018) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215345&download=yes). 
96 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 313, [108]  
(2017). “The term “smart contract” refers to decentralized computer code that runs on a 
DLT protocol and manifests some combination of the following characteristics: exerts some 
control over assets digitally recorded on a DLT protocol, takes some action upon receipt of 
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to be “subject to interpretation by outside entities or jurisdictions.”97 At 
present, tokens are being sold in “initial coin offerings” or “ICOs” in 
exchange for virtual currency.98  Some ICOs feature utility tokens which 
“grant holders the right to access (or a license to use) a given technology or 
participate in an online organization. They tend to provide holders with 
governance rights, such as the right to vote on how the online service should 
be updated or evolve”.99  Other ICOs offer investment tokens, which are 
“not only functional in nature but provide holders with economic rights, 
such as a share of profits generated by a project or organization.”100   
Tokens rely on “distributed ledger” technology for the processing of 
transactions.101 I have described this technology as “a large, decentralized 
database that is maintained on a network of computers rather than a single 
server, and that is updated in real-time”,102 but there are a number of 
different variants of the technology.  Distributed ledgers may or may not be 
controlled by a central authority (if not, they are described as 
“decentralized”), and they may also be “permissioned” or “permissionless” 
(with permissioned ledgers requiring some form of permission to join the 
network of computers that maintain the ledger, and permissionless ledgers 
allowing anyone to join).103   A related concept is the one of “trustlessness”: 
distributed ledgers may or may not be trustless, in the sense that they do not 
require third-party verification.104  Perhaps the most prominent example of a 
permissionless, trustless, decentralized ledger is the blockchain used to 
facilitate Bitcoin transactions.  However, the Ethereum ledger is the one that 
is typically used to host tokens and facilitate ICOs (at least for now). 105 
specified data, may be part of a DLT-based application, guarantees execution, and writes 
the resulting state change from the operation of the smart contract into the DLT’s ledger.” 
Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 12-13 (2018) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082915). 
97 David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (Jun. 27, 2016) (available at 
https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/)  “The utopian ideal is a 
“grand merger of law and computer security” which might render the protection offered by 
[traditional institutions] to be at best superfluous.” Cohney et al., supra Note 95 at 20. 
98 Randolph Robinson, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial 
Coin Offerings, 25 (Sept. 1, 2017) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087541). 
99 Id. at 13 
100 Id. at 14. 
101 Distributed ledger technology can also be used to process transactions involving assets 
other than digital money – including securities and real property.  Joshua A.T. Fairfield, 
Bitproperty, 88 S. Cal L. Rev. 805, 808–09 (2015).  However, an exploration of this 
application of distributed ledger technology is beyond the scope of this Article. 
102 Hilary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin?, 76 Md. L. Rev. 877, 887 (2017). “[E]ach party with 
the software can access the full ledger, its history, and can send information directly to 
other nodes, without going through an intermediary.”  Reyes, supra Note 96 at 9. 
103 Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A 
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 NYU J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 844 (2015).  
104 Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANK. & 
FIN. L. 713, 722 (2017).  
105 Robinson, supra Note 98 at 21.   
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ICOs have been described as the wild west of finance,106 and the 
SEC has made clear its concerns about ICOs being used to circumvent 
investor protection regulations.107  However, many assets that were once 
viewed as overly speculative and ripe for fraud have now matured into 
integral parts of standard asset portfolios.108  It is not difficult to conceive of 
ICOs as harbingers of an increasingly algorithmic world of finance where 
smart contracts represent other bundles of rights and obligations that can be 
bought and sold for sovereign as well as virtual currency. All financial 
assets are legally constructed;109 in the future, the legal contracts that 
comprise financial assets may take the form of self-executing algorithms, 
rather than being evidenced by the paper contracts that currently set out the 
rights and obligations of asset holders and issuers.  In this Article, I shall 
refer to financial assets that consist of a self-executing, self-enforcing 
algorithm as “smart assets” (this choice of name is derived from the term 
“smart contracts” – it is not intended to convey any judgment about whether 
such assets are in fact a good idea). 
Imagine, for example, a contingent convertible bond.  I have 
previously described such a bond (or “coco”, as it is colloquially known) as 
“a hybrid debt-equity instrument that starts its life as a debt instrument (like 
a bond) but will convert to common shares upon the occurrence of a “trigger 
event,” thus providing the issuing bank with a fresh infusion of common 
shares.”110 Typical convertible bonds convert to equity at the election of the 
bondholder; contingent convertible bonds instead convert upon the 
occurrence of pre-specified trigger events relating to accounting or market 
metrics, or to decisions by regulatory supervisors.111  Theoretically, the 
terms of a coco could be translated into computer code as a smart contract (a 
“smart coco”, if you will).  The smart contract would be recorded on some 
type of distributed ledger (perhaps the Ethereum ledger) and the contract’s 
106 See, for example, Id. 
107 “Those who offer and sell securities in the United States must comply with the federal 
securities laws, including the requirement to register with the Commission or to qualify for 
an exemption from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws. The 
registration requirements are designed to provide investors with procedural protections and 
material information necessary to make informed investment decisions. These requirements 
apply to those who offer and sell securities in the United States, regardless whether the 
issuing entity is a traditional company or a decentralized autonomous organization, 
regardless whether those securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, 
and regardless whether they are distributed in certificated form or through distributed ledger 
technology.” SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, 18 (Jul. 25, 2017) (available 
at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf). 
108 Cohney et al., supra Note 95 at 3. 
109 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECO. 315, 317 (2013). 
110 Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 
Ford. J. Corp. & Fin. L. 821, 852 (2013). 
111 Id. at 852-3. 
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code would work to automatically make interest payments from the issuer to 
the holder (the payments would be made in some form of virtual currency – 
in the future, there may even be virtual versions of sovereign currencies like 
the US Dollar).  If the holder wished to trade the smart coco, the distributed 
ledger would be updated to reflect the new holder of the smart coco, and the 
code would automatically order that interest payments be made to the new 
holder.  Meanwhile, the smart contract would check the information sources 
specified in its code at the times specified in its code to determine whether a 
trigger event has occurred.  Upon receiving information that the trigger 
event has occurred, the distributed ledger would immediately reflect that the 
holders no longer have any ownership interest in the smart cocos, but 
instead have an ownership interest in the equity of the issuer.  By design, 
humans would have no real opportunity to interrupt the performance of the 
conversion.112 
IV. POTENTIAL THREATS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY FROM FINANCIAL
ALGORITHMS 
This Section provides an analytical framework for assessing the 
threats that increased reliance on algorithms could pose for financial 
stability.  It demonstrates that problems will likely arise from increased 
complexity and speed, and the propensity of algorithms to entrench 
tendencies towards destabilizing correlation.  This Section also suggests that 
the financial industry’s failure to consider externalities is likely to be 
exacerbated by increased reliance on algorithms.  This Section uses the 
business models of robo-investing, marketplace lending, high frequency 
trading and tokens as illustrative examples, but this discussion is not 
restricted to any particular business model; it has broader application to all 
algorithm-reliant financial business models, even those that have not yet 
emerged.  Given how nascent the relevant technologies are, this Section 
does not attempt to provide an exhaustive catalog of the potential threats 
that driverless finance could pose for financial stability.  Nonetheless, the 
threats that are already apparent are sufficient to raise concerns how 
financial stability could be undermined as “driverless finance” becomes 
increasingly prominent.  
A. Algorithms and Complexity 
Since the Financial Crisis of 2007-8, many have commented on how 
the increasing complexity of the financial system has rendered it more 
fragile.113  This manifests in many different ways; in the context of risk 
112 Werbach & Cornell, supra Note 96 at 120. 
113 See, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008); Dan 
Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory 
Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012).  
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assessment, complexity “renders the system increasingly opaque to reasoned 
human cognition, making it more difficult to make thoughtful judgments 
about where risk lies”,114 and exacerbates our pre-existing tendency to 
underestimate low-probability but high-consequence tail risks115 (which are 
the very risks that are most likely to cause financial crises).116  Complexity 
also breeds opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and capture117 – concerns 
about the adverse impacts of complexity will only be magnified as financial 
algorithms become increasingly intricate and autonomous.118 
Admittedly, human beings have a very flawed history of financial 
risk assessment, one that has seen asset bubbles develop over and over again 
– as well as panics, once the bubble bursts.119  At first blush, it might seem
that replacing human foibles with sterile computer processing might 
improve such risk assessment: if we utilize Kahneman’s “System 1” and 
“System 2” framework to conceptualize human decision-making, we might 
anticipate that algorithms would be free from the instinctual responses 
generated by System 1, which were most likely developed as an 
evolutionary response to the difficulty of processing vast amounts of 
information quickly.120  These mental shortcuts or “heuristics” are often ill-
suited to generating accurate risk assessments in the financial context.121  
Algorithms specialize in processing vast amounts of information quickly, 
and thus are less likely to need a coping mechanism like System 1.  Instead, 
they are more likely to resemble the deliberative cognitive process of 
System 2.  However, notwithstanding that algorithms are better equipped to 
deal with large amounts of information, there are still a number of reasons to 
be skeptical of entirely automated risk-assessment procedures.    
First, and most obviously, algorithms may have bugs that prevent 
them from working as intended.  A second more nuanced concern arises 
with respect to predictive algorithms: attempting to translate complex 
decision-making into the formal logic of algorithmic code is bound to result 
114 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
872 (2015). 
115 Id. 
116 Allen, supra Note 5 at 206. 
117 Id. at 187; 199. 
118 For example, the FSB has noted that “the complexity and opacity of some big data 
analytics models makes it difficult … to assess the robustness of the models or new 
unforeseen risks in market behaviour, and to determine whether market participants are 
fully in control of their systems.”  FSB Fintech Report, supra Note 13 at 2. 
119 For historical discussions of financial bubbles, see Erik F. Gerding, LAW, BUBBLES 
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014); Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
120 Daniel Kahneman, THINKING FAST AND SLOW, [__] (2011).  
121 Andrew W. Lo, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED 
OF THOUGHT, [__] (2017). 
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in over-simplifications and unanticipated errors,122 in particular, to 
“privilege the measurable and mask uncertainty.”123  The uncertainty 
associated with tail risks is particularly likely to be masked or ignored 
because algorithms work most efficiently (meaning firms using algorithms 
will be able to perform their functions at greater speeds) if there are fewer 
lines of code.  In business models like high frequency trading where speed is 
a key competitive advantage, attempting to cater for unpredictable tail 
events by including more lines of code would be viewed as unnecessarily 
slowing down the functioning of the algorithm.124  (The issue of algorithms 
and speed will be explored more fully in the next Part).   
Where speed is less of a competitive advantage, an algorithm could 
potentially consider a broader universe of variables in making a risk 
assessment – particularly if the algorithm were capable of machine learning.  
With machine learning algorithms, a programmer will establish the 
parameters of the data set that the algorithm should learn from (a process 
known as “feature selection”),125 and the algorithm will then make its own 
decisions about which data to take into account in assessing risks.  However, 
such assessments will be circumscribed by any limitations in the feature 
selection, and the process by which the algorithm decides which variables 
are relevant and how to weight them will be opaque to everyone.126  
Furthermore, while such algorithms can observe correlations, they cannot 
determine causation:127 they may therefore misjudge the impact of a variable 
on a risk-assessment.  If a machine learning algorithm were to make a 
demonstrable mistake in assessing risk, the technology does not yet exist to 
teach the algorithm not to make the same mistake again in the future.128  As 
such, notwithstanding that algorithmic risk-assessment is likely to be 
superior to human judgment in some respects, we should be wary of 
automating the process entirely. 
Unfortunately, the more “driverless” an algorithm purports to be, the 
more likely human beings – whether regulators or market participants – are 
to defer to its risk assessment without interrogating its underlying process.  
These tendencies have been referred to as “automation biases – decision 
pathologies that hinder careful review of automated outcomes”.129  Such 
biases can lead humans to “disregard or not search for contradictory 
122 “[T]heir translation efforts are colored by their own disciplinary assumptions, the 
technical constraints of requirements engineering, and limits arising from the cost and 
capacity of state-of-the-art computing.” Bamberger, supra Note 27 at 708. 
123 Id. at 676 
124 Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1655 (2015). 
125 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 681 (2017). 
126 Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at 22. 
127 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 6. 
128 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 89; Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 11. 
129 Bamberger, supra Note 27 at 676. 
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information in light of a computer-generated solution that is accepted as 
correct”,130 and have been demonstrated to be particularly likely in 
circumstances where it is in a person’s financial interest to defer to the 
algorithm’s decision131 (as it often seems to be where an underestimation of 
tail risk allows people to believe they are receiving above-market returns on 
their investments).132  There is a temptation for those proficient in 
algorithms to exploit these automation biases to avoid the “spirit” of the 
regulation, while apparently complying with its letter (a phenomenon 
referred to as “regulatory arbitrage”).133  Machine learning techniques are 
already being used by banks to refine their compliance with regulatory 
capital and other prudential requirements, and the Financial Stability Board 
has raised concerns that, while legal, these efforts may increase systemic 
risks by allowing “much tighter liquidity buffers, higher leverage, and faster 
maturity transformation than in cases where AI and machine learning had 
not been used for such optimization.”134 Some programmers (or their 
employers) may even use the complexity of algorithmic programming 
affirmatively, purposefully over-engineering and rapidly updating code in 
order to confound competitors and deflect regulatory scrutiny.135 Pasquale 
has also raised concerns that the complexity of financial algorithms will be 
used to cognitively capture the regulators, meaning that the developers of 
the technology will be able to convince regulators that they, rather than less 
tech-savvy regulators, should be responsible for determining whether 
algorithms are complying with extant regulations.136   
If regulators were to effectively wave the white flag with respect to 
supervision of complex financial algorithms, the increased use of such 
algorithms would have a broadly deregulatory effect.  For example, if 
130 Id. at 712. 
131 Id.  
132 “To satisfy demand for seemingly higher-yield, lower-risk products, financial 
institutions often use financial engineering to consolidate risk in the tail where investors are 
notoriously likely to disregard it…When investors do not properly recognize the tail risk 
inherent in a financial instrument, they are likely to accept a yield that does not properly 
compensate them for the risk they are taking on, and the instrument is likely to be wildly 
popular.” Allen, supra Note 5 at 216-217.  
133 Regulatory arbitrage has been described by one commentator as the exploitation of “the 
gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, 
taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels 
that track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.” Victor Fleischer,
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010)  
134 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 30. 
135 Awrey, supra Note 113 at 263. 
136 Frank Pasquale, Exploring the Fintech Landscape, WRITTEN TESTIMONY BEFORE 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS, 5; 13 (Sept. 12, 2017). Such arguments about technological complexity 
have succeeded in the past, such as when regulators acceded to the Basel II Capital Accord, 
which essentially allowed the largest banks to set their own regulatory capital requirements 
using complex internal modeling – see Erik F. Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank Capital: 
Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 Washburn L.J. 357, 375 (2016). 
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regulators were to determine that the algorithms used by marketplace 
lending platforms were so complex as to be inscrutable, then that could 
facilitate a situation where mispriced credit is extended to dubious 
applicants, fuelling a bubble in the assets that such credit is used to 
purchase.137 The marketplace lending firm Prosper, for example, assigns 
“risk ratings” to individual loans to assist investors in selecting loans in 
which to invest.138  If such risk ratings were assigned by a machine learning 
algorithm that learned to assess borrower risk in a way that neglects a shared 
characteristic of many borrowers, then those borrowers could default en 
masse in the event of a circumstance unanticipated by the algorithm (the 
relationship between increased use of algorithms and correlation will be 
explored in greater detail later in this Section).  Investors in marketplace 
loans typically have little loan-level data, and are thus largely reliant on the 
output of the platform’s algorithms to judge possible investments.139  If 
those algorithms are inscrutable, then that may encourage loans that are 
“over-issued relative to what would be possible under rational 
expectations.”140  
The Treasury Department has already noted that “[n]ew business 
models and underwriting tools have been developed in a period of very low 
interest rates, declining unemployment, and strong overall credit 
conditions”, and that “this industry remains untested through a complete 
credit cycle.”141  If a bubble were to develop in marketplace loans, and then 
burst, then that could have a deleterious impact on the broader economy.  
Admittedly, because investors in marketplace loans have no contractual 
right to receive immediate repayment from the marketplace lending platform 
(instead, repayment is subject to the terms of the note issued by the platform 
to the investor, and conditioned upon repayment by the ultimate borrower), 
the marketplace lending model does not appear to be susceptible to runs in 
the way that the traditional bank lending model is.142  However, because of 
137 For a discussion of how securitization demand resulted in nontraditional mortgage 
lending prior to the Financial Crisis, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning 
a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 
(2007). 
138 https://www.prosper.com/about-us/wp-content/uploads/InvestorsGuide.pdf.  
139 Kirby & Worner, supra Note 78 at 41-42. 
140 Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Financial Innovation and 
Financial Fragility, FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI NOTA DI LAVORO 
114.2010, 5 (May, 2010). 
141 U.S. Department of Treasury, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE 
MARKETPLACE LENDING, 1 (May 10, 2016) (available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/Opportunities%20and%20Challenges%
20in%20Online%20Marketplace%20Lending%20vRevised.pdf). 
142 Richard Scott Carnell et al., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (5th Ed.),  
50-51. It is theoretically possible, though, that a P2P lender may refund investments for 
reputational reasons (just as Citibank did for investors in its Special Investment Vehicles 
during the Financial Crisis), even without any legal obligation to do so – such a course of 
action could impact the P2P firm’s solvency.  For a discussion of Citibank’s treatment of 
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the opacity relating to the quality of individual marketplace loans and the 
algorithms used to judge them, any of the following might incentivize 
investors to panic and stop providing funding for future marketplace loans: 
concerns about the ability of the platforms’ algorithms to select creditworthy 
borrowers; concerns that borrowers are defaulting on existing marketplace 
loans (particularly if such defaults are correlated);143 and fears that 
secondary securitization market demand for marketplace loans is drying up.  
Marketplace lending has become an increasingly important source of 
funding for small business enterprises, many of whom roll over these loans 
in order to meet their funding needs,144 so if investors were to retreat from 
renewing funding en masse, then that would harm those enterprises and 
hamper broader economic growth.145  There could therefore be significant, 
tangible consequences if the complexity of marketplace lending algorithms 
render them impenetrable to regulators and market participants alike.  
B. Algorithms and Speed 
The speed with which algorithms operate can also be a problem for 
financial stability: as Kirilenko and Lo wryly note “whatever can go wrong 
will go wrong faster and bigger when computers are involved.”146  Financial 
algorithms can make and implement decisions too quickly for any human 
intervention (by their programmers, users or regulators), even when 
something clearly erroneous has occurred.  The fact that algorithms work 
well most of the time can exacerbate this problem; as has been noted in the 
driverless car context, “[a] technology that works well right up to the point 
that it doesn’t, particularly when that point demands the attention of a user 
who has lost concentration, represents a significant regulatory problem.”147  
Algorithmically-increased transaction speeds also allow for an increased 
volume of transacting,148 and increased volumes of transactions allow for 
institutions to contract with more counterparties, resulting in an even more 
interconnected financial system.149  Increased transactional speed thus 
facilitates an environment where “the numerous linkages between financial 
SIVs during the Crisis, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 380 (2011). 
143 The issue of “correlation by algorithm” will be examined in more detail in Section IV.C. 
144 Clozel, supra Note 80. 
145 One industry participant has estimated that institutional investors now provide “80–90% 
of the capital deployed through Prosper and Lending Club”. Nav Athwal, The 
Disappearance of Peer-to-Peer Lending, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2014, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/14/the- disappearance-of-peer-to-peer-
lending).  “Institutional investors … may herd to avoid falling behind one another by 
picking the same stocks as each other.” Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and 
Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 777-778 (2002). 
146 Andrei A. Kirilenko and Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law: 
Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2013). 
147 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 17-18. 
148 Omarova, supra Note 56 at [27-28]. 
149 Omarova, supra Note 56 at [42]. 
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institutions and products function as feedback loops that can speed up and 
amplify the transmission of shocks throughout the financial system”.150   
Issues resulting from the speed with which financial algorithms 
process data and respond have manifested most obviously in the context of 
high frequency trading, with several algorithmic trading glitches (most 
notably the Flash Crash) sending financial markets haywire.151  While such 
glitches have not yet caused irreversible systemic problems, that does not 
mean that they will not do so in the future. As I have noted in prior work, 
increased use of HFT algorithms can “build rigid feedback loops and tight 
coupling into the financial system, with the result that a shock in one asset 
class can be transmitted quickly through the equities markets and disrupt 
pricing and liquidity in other parts of the financial system in short order”.152 
Similar problems could also arise in the robo-investment context: if 
algorithms were designed to execute trades on behalf of investors without 
any input from those investors (for example, if they automatically rebalance 
investor portfolios) and some glitch forced an en masse sale of a particular 
type of asset, then the price of that asset class would be depressed and 
financial institutions exposed to that asset class might be forced to sell other 
assets in order to maintain their solvency.  In this way, such a dynamic 
could ignite fire sales in a variety of different markets.   
When algorithms facilitate the execution of transactions at such a 
pace, it precludes the exercise of reasoned human judgment and 
intervention.  Such problems can arise not only when algorithms are making 
decisions about transacting, but also when there is an algorithm embedded 
in the financial asset itself.  However, the risks to financial stability that 
could arise from using smart contracts to speed up the execution of financial 
transactions have not yet been explored.  These smart contracts are 
algorithms programmed to self-execute upon the receipt of the necessary 
instructions and/or data; for proponents of smart contracts, one of their 
greatest attributes is said to be their “immutability”.153  Unfortunately, the 
future operations of the financial system are uncertain in the Knightian 
sense, meaning that future outcomes and their probabilities are 
unknowable.154 Because no algorithm can be programmed in advance to 
address all potential scenarios, subsequent changes may therefore be 
150 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
872 (2015). 
151 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715, 738 
(2018) 
152 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
872 (2015). 
153 “Legal contracts contain ambiguity and permit formal and informal modifications, but 
smart contracts are drafted in exhaustive, precise code that seems to set the parties’ 
obligations permanently.” Cohney et al., supra Note 95 at 25. 
154 Pistor, supra Note 109 at 316. 
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necessary to vary the operation of the smart contract.155  Legal systems 
interpreting paper financial contracts have developed the ability to relax and 
suspend contractual obligations in order to help preserve financial stability 
upon the occurrence of a significant unanticipated event,156 and as Pistor has 
noted, “in the context of a highly instable financial system, the elasticity of 
law has proved time and again critical for avoiding a complete financial 
meltdown.”157  Smart contracts have the potential to harm financial stability 
by depriving the financial system of some of its flexibility: to the extent that 
smart contracts are recorded and run on a decentralized distributed ledger, 
there is no one individual who can vary the preprogrammed operation of 
that contract158 – even if the result diverges from the mutual intent of the 
parties thereto, as well as the public interest.159  While smart contracts may 
not turn out to be as immutable as they claim to be (traditional ex post legal 
remedies may ultimately be able to be applied to force the alteration of the 
distributed ledger on which the smart contract is hosted in order to undo a 
transaction), the damage may already have been done as a result of the 
speed with which the smart contract executed its programming in the first 
place. 
The hypothetical “smart coco” can be used to illustrate how 
problems might arise from this lack of flexibility.  If a smart coco were 
designed with a capital-based trigger (meaning that it is programmed to 
convert to equity as soon as the issuer’s ratio of equity to risk-weighted 
assets falls below a predetermined level),160 then conversion of the smart 
coco from debt to equity would be effected immediately upon it receiving 
information that the issuer’s ratio had fallen below the specified level 
(information about the issuer’s ratio would be drawn from an external 
source – an “oracle”, in smart contract-speak).161  Many large financial 
institutions use their own internal computer models to calculate their ratios 
of equity to risk-weighted assets;162 if a smart contract was designed to 
communicate directly with the issuer’s internal model, a glitch in the 
operation of that model could force an unwarranted conversion.  Because 
155 Paper contracts rely on the legal system to perform this function: “Since the parties 
cannot foresee all contingencies, they can use vague contract terms to delegate to the courts 
the task of completing the contract ex post.” Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contractual 
Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV 1023, 1071 (2009). 
156 Pistor, supra Note 109 at 320. 
157 Id. at 321. 
158 Werbach & Cornell, supra Note 96 at [120]. 
159 Id. at [106]. 
160 A 2018 article in the Economist noted that while many cocos are set to trigger if their 
issuer’s ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets falls below 5.125%, some cocos specify a 
trigger as high as 7%. Coco Bonds Have Not Lived Up to Their Promise, THE 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2018) (available at https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2018/04/21/coco-bonds-have-not-lived-up-to-their-promise). 
161 “In the language of smart contracts, systems that interpret such external fees and verify 
contractual performance are called “oracles”.” Werbach & Cornell, supra Note 96 at [124]. 
162 Gerding, supra Note 136 at 375. 
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conversion is viewed as undesirable and the trigger event for any coco is 
designed to be low-probability,163 an erroneous conversion is likely to 
incentivize a panic that “is likely to manifest itself in the form of funding 
shortages for the coco issuer which will impact its ability to operate as a 
going-concern.”164 
If the coco were evidenced by a paper contract, some form of human 
intervention would be required to effect the conversion, which would allow 
time for verification that the trigger had in fact been met.  A self-executing 
smart contract would not allow for any such check, however – nor is it clear 
how a smart contract would respond to a correction to the oracle’s 
information (unless it were preprogrammed to allow for reversals of 
conversion).  If the smart contract were not programmed to reverse in 
response to being informed a problem with the oracle (or if policymakers 
were to determine that the oracle was correct, but that conversion should 
nonetheless be waived in the interests of avoiding a shock to the financial 
system), a reversal could only be carried out by altering the distributed 
ledger on which the smart contract was hosted to undo the transaction.  Such 
a reversal would require the consensus of the majority of the nodes with the 
power to approve transactions on the ledger, and on a decentralized 
permissionless ledger, it may be hard to identify who those nodes are.165  In 
the past, established bodies like court systems and central banks have acted 
to relax legal obligations to mitigate financial shocks, but their authority and 
jurisdiction over such nodes is likely to be unclear.166   
Abstracting away from our “smart coco” to financial assets more 
generally, new sources of systemic risk will be introduced into the financial 
system by any widely-adopted financial asset that is comprised of a smart 
contract that speedily and rigidly self-executes.167  While there may 
ultimately be more opportunities to vary a smart contract’s operation168 – 
and more opportunities for legal institutions to adjudicate on the outcome of 
smart contracts169 – than proponents of smart contracts care to admit, there 
163 Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 125, 156 
(2012). 
164 Id. 
165 Werbach & Cornell, supra Note 96 at [161-2] 
166 Cohney et al., supra Note 95 at 21. 
167 Pistor notes that in order to avoid systemic failures, safety valves are needed to make 
financial contracts more elastic when there has been a significant change in circumstances 
such that “one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without 
alteration.” Pistor, supra Note 109 at 329. 
168 It is clear from the SEC’s report on its investigation of the DAO, for example, that the 
programmers and validators were able to change the protocol of the distributed ledger to 
return virtual currency to persons from whom it had been stolen.  See SEC, supra Note 107 
at 9.   
169 Werbach & Cornell argue that smart contracts have no mechanism for addressing 
grievances after performance of the contract, and that the courts will continue to fill such a 
role. Werbach & Cornell, supra Note 96 at [151]. 
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will still be uncertainties about when the operation of the smart asset can be 
changed and challenged, and by whom. The power to vary the operation of a 
smart contract (by altering the distributed ledger on which transactions 
relating to the smart contract are recorded) will typically lie with a group of 
validators – to the extent that the ledger is decentralized and permissionless, 
coordination and jurisdictional issues may create uncertainty as to whether 
and when those validators will in fact alter the ledger.170  Following an 
unanticipated event, uncertainty about the operation of a widely-used 
financial asset comprising a smart contract could paralyze the use, and thus 
the liquidity, of that asset class (as well as any linked asset classes, such as 
derivatives that reference it).  Highly leveraged institutions with significant 
exposure to such assets might then need to sell those and other assets, 
potentially depressing asset prices system-wide (a so-called “fire sale 
externality”).171 
C. Algorithms and Correlation 
A panicked fire sale is just one example of “herding”, a well-
documented phenomenon that is inimical to financial stability.  When 
market participants behave in a correlated manner, such participation will 
often lead to suboptimal outcomes for the financial system as a whole: in 
particular, herding causes problems by inflating asset bubbles in good times, 
and exacerbating panics (which can take the form of runs, as well as fire 
sales of assets) once a shock occurs.172  One concern that has been raised 
about robo-investing in particular is the potential for algorithms to 
exacerbate tendencies towards herd behavior by making preferences more 
monolithic: when financial decision-making is automated and performed by 
a few algorithms rather than a crowd of individuals,173 market behavior is 
likely to be become even more correlated.174  (It has also been noted that 
HFT algorithms tend to “react to market events in a herd-like fashion”).175  
Predictive robo-investing algorithms will be particularly likely to exacerbate 
correlation if they are “sticky” (in the sense that once the algorithm has been 
programmed, there is a preference not to tinker too much with its 
operation),176 meaning that algorithmic preferences are less likely to diverge 
even when circumstances change.  While humans also demonstrate 
tendencies towards path dependency, the switching costs are presumably 
170 Id. at [168]. 
171 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 
23(1) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 77, 94 (2009). 
172 See Erik F. Gerding, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014). 
173 The fintech industry tends towards dominant market players with commanding market 
share – a so-called “winner-take-all” market. William J. Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 
VAND. L. REV 1167, 1212 (2018). 
174 FSB Fintech Report, supra Note 13 at 20.  Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at [__]. 
175 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715, 743 
(2018). 
176 Bamberger, supra Note 27 at 710. 
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lower for changing one’s mind than they are for calling in the programmers 
to reprogram an algorithm in light of changed circumstances.   
As Baker and Dellaert note, “the potential solvency and systemic 
risks posed by hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of consumers 
choosing their financial products based on the same or similar models are 
sufficiently large and different in kind from those traditionally posed by 
consumer financial product intermediaries that some regulatory attention is 
justified.”177  Robo-investing algorithms currently work by assigning an 
investor to a particular risk profile (FINRA recently surveyed firms and 
found that “most establish between five and eight investor profiles”), and 
constructing portfolios for each of those profiles.178  Here, economies of 
scale make financial advice cheaper for investors, but also allow algorithms 
to influence the behavior of far larger groups than would be possible for a 
single human financial advisor.  Obviously, such an approach will correlate 
investments more than if individualized portfolios were constructed for each 
customer.179  In order to avoid the need for costly interpersonal meetings, 
many robo-investing firms distribute questionnaires to investors online, and 
use these as the exclusive basis for their investment recommendations.180  
Such an approach may further increase correlation amongst investment 
portfolios, to the extent that it reduces the characteristics of individual 
investors to fewer datapoints.181  Of course, there are also limitations on the 
ability of a human investment advisor to gather a complete picture of their 
clients’ needs, but a good argument can be made that the risks of 
oversimplification and misunderstandings are greater “when advice is 
provided using an automated tool than advice provided with human 
interaction, because of a reduced ability to clarify misunderstandings and 
ask questions.”182  The absence of a human contact may also make it more 
likely that consumers will fail to advise their robo-investing platform as 
their personal circumstances change.183  Notwithstanding that human 
financial advisers can provide more personalized advice than the current 
177 Baker & Dellaert, supra Note 60 at 3. 
178 FINRA, supra Note 62 at 6. 
179 Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Correlation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326 
(2011).  If robo-investing algorithms are developed by third-party vendors rather than in-
house, portfolios even across robo-investing platforms may become correlated.   
180 SEC, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBO-ADVISERS, 1 
(Feb. 2017) (available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf). 
181 Such datapoints might include “the investor’s tax situation, marital or relationship status, 
the investor’s career and retirement plans, what other investments and assets the investor 
has, the investor’s financial resources and commitments, and the investor’s plans for their 
family in the short and longer term”.  European Banking Authority, JOINT COMMITTEE 
DISCUSSION PAPER ON AUTOMATION IN FINANCIAL ADVICE, 14 (Dec. 4, 2015) 
(available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1299866/JC+2015+080+Discussion+Paper+o
n+automation+in+financial+advice.pdf). 
182 Id. at 22 
183 Id. at 22-23. 
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crop of robo-investing platforms, it may prove difficult for human advisers 
to compete with the cost savings associated with more automated advice 
models – this may speed the trend towards correlation by algorithm.184   
As robo-investing platforms increasingly adopt machine learning 
techniques, some forms of correlation may be mitigated.  A machine 
learning algorithm may be able to continually search the internet for many 
different types of data to inform its understanding of an individual client’s 
ideal investment portfolio, and provide more personalized advice than 
current robo-investing models.185  A machine learning algorithm may also 
be able to learn from changes in the markets and adjust its decision-making 
accordingly.  However, it is impossible to predict what machine learning 
algorithms will do with the personal and market data they glean;186 it is also 
unclear what data set will they use to learn what constitutes a good or bad 
financial decision in any given circumstance.  To the extent that all of the 
robo-investing algorithms are learning from the same data set of historical 
market information, they are likely to learn to react in correlated ways.187  
Machine learning algorithms also tend to learn probabilistically,188 meaning 
there is a real concern that such algorithms will consistently underemphasize 
low-probability but potentially high-consequence risks in choosing 
investment of strategies. 
If different robo-investing algorithms behave in consistent ways,189 
or if a few robo-investing platforms (and their algorithms) achieve market 
dominance,190 then that could create the conditions for both bubbles and 
184 Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers 
Rescue the Retail Market, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 106 (2018). 
185 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 30. 
186 Id. 
187 See Mattioli at 284 for a discussion of machine learning and training data in the 
autonomous vehicle context. Mattioli, supra Note 29 at 284. 
188 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 90 
189 In the context of HFT, Yadav has noted that algorithms are often based on similar 
assumptions, and thus often react to market events in a herd-like fashion.  Yadav, supra 
Note 124 at 1622.  Correlated behavior is also likely to result because the development of 
machine learning for use in robo-investing applications is currently dependent on a 
“relatively small number of third-party technological developers and service providers.” 
FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 27. 
190 Van Loo notes that extreme concentration is endemic in digital markets, “in which as 
few as two or three companies capture the bulk of the market.” Rory Van Loo, Digital 
Market Perfection, 11 (2019) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308524).  In its recent report on 
Fintech, the Treasury Department also noted the network effects that are likely to lead to a 
concentrated market: “models that have a large market presence, therefore, have a built-in 
self- reinforcing advantage as their gains in market share improve the model’s performance, 
which could in turn further their gain in market share.” Treasury Report, supra Note 18 at 
57.
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panics.191  A bubble could form, for example, if numerous consumers are 
advised to invest in the same financial portfolio, or if they are steered to a 
particular asset by an algorithm that underestimates the asset’s associated 
risks.  If that same algorithm advises selling assets, then the occurrence of 
that event could have a sudden impact on the price of those assets system-
wide, and depressed asset prices might force other market participants to sell 
other assets to deleverage, creating problems for asset pricing in general, 
and the stability of the financial system as a whole.192  (Even if the 
algorithm doesn’t advise selling, individuals with correlated portfolios may 
still panic and do so: “each acting individually but, as a group, influencing 
asset prices and affecting the trading decision of others”).193  This bubble-
bust dynamic would be particularly acute in the event that the relevant 
algorithms were not programmed (or did not learn) to perceive the initial 
stages of disenchantment with an asset.  In such a situation, they might 
continue to recommend buying as usual (without adjusting for stressed 
market conditions) until conditions become so fraught as to trigger a 
panicked response from either the algorithm or investors.194 
Excessive correlation may even undermine a robo-investing 
algorithm’s own internal logic:195 many robo-investing algorithms are based 
on economic theories (like Modern Portfolio Theory) that have embedded 
assumptions, particularly about the use of diversification to manage risk.196  
However, diversification is unable to address systematic risks that affect the 
entire market.  If investments are increasingly channeled towards just a few 
large asset classes (as a result of instructions from the same or similar 
algorithms), then it will become increasingly likely that a problem with one 
large asset class will impact investor sentiment about other large asset 
classes. This type of risk cannot be diversified away, leaving correlated 
portfolios more susceptible to a shock to the financial markets.  This is not 
just a retail investor issue, either – sophisticated hedge funds are also 
increasingly relying upon machine learning to inform their trading 
decisions.197 
191 Baker and Dellaert have noted that “as robo advisors gain scale, there may be collective 
action problems that arise from ranking and matching services that are individually rational 
but have perverse consequences for financial product markets.”  Baker & Dellaert, supra 
Note 60 at 31. 
192 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 
23(1) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 77, 94 (2009). 
193 Whitehead, supra Note 179 at 347. 
194 See Notes 29-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of algorithms and edge cases in 
the autonomous vehicle context. 
195 As Whitehead put it, coordination “can erode key presumptions underlying financial risk 
management, reducing its effectiveness and magnifying a systemic impact of a downturn in 
the financial markets.” Whitehead, supra Note 179 at 326. 
196 FINRA, supra Note 62 at 3-4. 
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“Correlation by algorithm” could also result from the marketplace 
lending business model.  Here, firms like Prosper and Lending Club use 
algorithms to screen potential borrowers and tout their resulting ability to 
approve borrowers who would not qualify under traditional FICO 
assessments (through origination and servicing fees, they also profit from 
approving increased volumes of loans).198  In an industry where only a few 
firms (and their algorithms) dominate,199 there is the possibility that using an 
algorithm to make credit decisions could result in credit being channeled 
consistently to the same type of borrower, whereas there might be more 
variation in approval decisions if credit approvals were based on judgments 
by different human beings.  Correlations in these algorithms’ assumptions 
about who should and should not qualify for credit could have broader 
systemic implications if they systematically underestimate or misprice the 
risk associated with a particular type of borrower (particularly if credit 
approval algorithms are capable of machine learning and learn to become 
more lax in response to data about the declining interest rates of other 
lenders, which could result in a race to the bottom).200 
Correlation by algorithm could also arise in other (perhaps as yet 
unimaginable) contexts.  The Financial Stability Board has already started to 
urge caution in light of the fact that many of the machine learning 
applications that have been developed to date rely on a “relatively small 
number of third-party technological developers and service providers.”201  A 
single glitch or operational failure could thus impact many otherwise 
disparate financial service providers.  Even if the impact of such a glitch or 
operational failure were confined to one or a few institutions, uncertainty 
about the reliability of technology may be sufficient to damage confidence 
in otherwise unaffected financial institutions.  When a financial institution 
relies heavily upon short-term debt to fund its operations (as many do), a 
loss of confidence can imperil the continuing availability of that funding, 
and potentially result in the insolvency of the institution.202  Correlation by 
algorithm (whether actual or perceived) is therefore a trend to be watched 
with care. 
D. Algorithms and Industry Culture 
198 Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 445, 469 (2011). 
199 For a discussion of market concentration, see Note 190, supra. 
200 To illustrate the plausibility of a scenario, one can consider the instance where “the price 
of a book, The Making of a Fly by Peter Lawrence, ballooned on Amazon from a few 
dollars to over twenty-three million dollars because each of two sellers of the item had 
algorithmically set its price in relation to the other.” Id. at 26. 
201 FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 27. 
202 Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 
FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 864-5 (2013). 
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Interesting questions are raised when algorithms, which operate by 
way of on-off rules and linear and logical progressions of decision trees, 
start to take over tasks that would have in the past been completed by human 
beings making context-specific judgments informed by a multiplicity of 
variables, including morality. Morality is relevant to discussions of financial 
stability: even when not fraudulent, many of the behaviors that generated the 
Financial Crisis evinced a disregard for the impact of negative externalities 
on other members of society.203  There is therefore a place for reforms that 
seek to engender industry-wide cultural norms that can act as a disciplinary 
force, creating an environment in which financial industry personnel will 
consider the long-term impact of their risk-taking on society as a whole.204  
Since the Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the UK’s 
Financial Conduct Authority, and many other central banks and financial 
regulators have been particularly vocal about the importance of shaping 
institutional cultures in a way that promotes financial stability.205  
Regulatory initiatives aimed at improving financial industry culture 
have certainly been critiqued.  Arguments have been made that cultural 
initiatives serve as distraction from more concrete regulatory efforts, and the 
efficacy of such efforts has also been questioned.  Gordon and Zaring, for 
example, have argued that “if the question is how to ensure a stable banking 
system, the answer is unlikely to lie solely—or even much—in the embrace 
of ethics by bankers.”206  Regulators implementing programs targeted at 
industry culture should undoubtedly be mindful of the limits of cultural 
change in promoting financial stability, and the limits on their ability to 
effect cultural change at all.  However, other forms of regulation are limited 
too: it is impossible to prescribe rules for every potential context and 
contingency, and so discretion must therefore be left to financial industry 
personnel to make appropriate decisions as new situations arise.  I have 
argued that these limitations justify actively pursuing attempts to render the
financial industry more cognizant of the impacts of its risk-taking on others 
– notwithstanding that such attempts will be exceedingly challenging and
will not obviate the need for other, more concrete, financial stability 
regulations.207  More recently, Brummer and Yadav have argued that the 
203 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
870 (2015). 
204“[U]nethical cultures have been recognized as a risk for the global financial system.” 
John M. Conley et al., Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central 
Bank’s Supervision of Behavior and Culture, 5 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3277678). 
205 Conley, supra Note 204 at 5.  For example, the FCA has suggested that the efforts of the 
financial industry might be better channeled towards the public good if firms take steps “to 
enhance employees’ understanding of how their work has a real world impact. . . to ensure 
that employees do not regard their work as simply ‘numbers on a screen’, but acknowledge 
the importance of a well-functioning finance sector for the wider economy.”  FCA at 35. 
206 Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers, 42 J. CORP. L. 559, 586 (2017). 
207 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
909 (2015). 
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need for industry self-governance will only become more acute as 
technology outpaces regulators.208 
The Dutch central bank’s Behavior & Culture supervision initiative, 
intended to address culture “not as a mere component of legal compliance 
but as an independent phenomenon with the capacity to cause inappropriate 
risk-taking by financial institutions” is a promising step in this direction.209 
However, the ability of a good corporate culture to discipline risk-taking is 
dependent on “social approval, disapproval, praise or embarrassment” as 
well as esprit de corps, in shaping behavior.210   These mechanisms are very 
human emotions and experiences, and as more and more decisions are 
delegated to algorithms, the disciplining power of a good corporate culture 
will be lessened – and thus the impact of hard-fought regulatory efforts to 
inculcate a good corporate culture will be further limited.211  In particular, 
the organizational culture literature has recognized certain phenomena like 
“ethical fading” and “moral self-licensing” that contribute to immoral or 
unethical behavior within businesses, and increased reliance on algorithmic 
decision-making is likely to exacerbate the likelihood of such phenomena 
occurring.   
Tenbrunsel and Messick have described “ethical fading” as a 
phenomenon whereby individuals are able to engage in self-deception as to 
their culpability, and thus avoid the disciplining impact of beneficial cultural 
and social norms, “because psychological processes fade the “ethics” from 
an ethical dilemma.”212  Once the ethics have been drained from the decision 
making context, “individuals can behave in a self-interested manner and still 
hold the conviction that they are ethical persons.”213  Some of the 
mechanisms identified by Tenbrunsel and Messick as facilitating this self-
deception are likely to be exacerbated by increased reliance on algorithms.  
For example, they note that an actor is more likely to avoid a sense of moral 
responsibility when engaging in acts of omission, rather than commission.214  
208 Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 7 (2018) 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054770). 
209 Conley, supra Note 204 at 7.  
210 Andrew W. Lo, The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial 
Industry, FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW 17, 19 (Aug. 2016). 
211 “[W]ith greater electronic connectivity—and less actual in-person connection—the basic 
human ties that foster self-restraint and greater trust may be lost.” Tom Glocer, The Effect 
of Technology on Bank Culture (Oct. 19, 2016) (available at 
https://bankinnovation.net/2016/10/the-effect-of-technology-on-bank-culture/). 
212 Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in 
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 223, 224 (2004). 
213 Id. at 225. 
214 “Acts of omission. . . blur the assignment of responsibility, can create self-biased 
perceptions of causes, shifting blame from self to others. In such circumstances, it is highly 
likely that individuals’ propensity to engage in unethical behavior increases, because 
shifting responsibility to others allows one to divorce oneself from the moral implications 
of their actions.” Id. at 230. 
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Viewed in this light, increased reliance on algorithms may result in less 
ethical behavior from people who rely on algorithms to discharge their 
functions, because the more that decision-making is delegated to algorithms, 
the more the decision makers can divorce themselves from responsibility for 
the outcomes of those decisions.215  At the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York’s 2016 conference on “Reforming Culture and Behavior in the 
Financial Services Industry”, participants raised the concern that “if new 
technology can flag technical non-compliance, is there a risk that employees 
will conflate an automated answer with an ethical decision? If the terminal 
says OK, may I execute a trade?”216  Indeed, psychological research 
suggests that not only the actors themselves, but even unrelated third parties, 
may be more likely to judge the actors more leniently when the unethical 
action has been delegated to an algorithm,217 exempting the actors from any 
opprobrium which might otherwise have caused them to have more regard 
for the implications of their actions.  
Ethical fading may also be an issue for the coders who program the 
algorithms, not just the humans who work alongside the algorithms.  
Programmers may delude themselves as to the acceptability of the internal 
workings of the algorithm on the grounds that “if the past practices were 
ethical and acceptable, then practices that are similar and not too different 
are also acceptable”.  However, “a series of these small steps can lead to a 
journey of unethical and illegal activities.”218  If programmers do not 
consider the impact of small incremental “tweaks” that they make to an 
algorithm, simply because those tweaks are small and incremental, they will 
disregard the collective impact that those changes may have on financial 
stability.  Tenbrunsel and Messick also argue that using “cold language” that 
disguises the human cost of business decisions is also effective in promoting 
ethical fading.219  Algorithmic programming uses even more dehumanized 
computer programming languages to effect outcomes, which may further 
disguise the human impact of the algorithm’s processes.  Decisions that do 
not contemplate their potential impacts on financial stability may thus 
become more likely as algorithm-reliant business models become 
increasingly prominent. 
The phenomenon of “moral licensing” may also be exacerbated by 
increased reliance on algorithms.  “Moral self-licensing occurs when 
215 Tutt notes that “(1) algorithmic responsibility will be difficult to measure; (2) 
algorithmic responsibility will be difficult to trace; and (3) human responsibility will be 
difficult to assign.” Tutt, supra Note 6 at 105. 
216 https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/2016-
Culture-Conference-Overview.pdf 
217 Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. BUS. REV, 9-
10 (Apr. 2011). Kroll et al. note that “decisions made by computers may enjoy an 
undeserved assumption of fairness and objectivity.”  Kroll et al., supra Note 125 at 680. 
218 Tenbrunsel & Messic, supra Note 212 at 228. 
219 Id. at 227.  
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evidence of a person’s virtue frees him or her to act less-than-virtuously,”220 
and can manifest at the organizational, as well as the individual, level.221  At 
the organizational level, the result is that some people may consider 
themselves licensed by the good deeds performed by in-group members, and 
thus feel free to neglect ethical concerns without feeling any compunction in 
their own self-regard, or in shame from others.222  Prosocial behavior – like 
consideration by a financial institution employee of the impact of his or her 
activities on financial stability – can thus be rendered less likely when there 
is some kind of outward “proof” of the virtue of the employee, or the 
institution as a whole.223  If algorithms are seen to be making virtuous 
decisions (particularly in terms of managing risks), then increased reliance 
on algorithms could also result in a moral licensing effect, increasing the 
propensity of human employees to disregard the impact of their own 
activities on financial stability.   
The FCA has recognized that undesirable behavior might be easier to 
for humans to justify in environments of ambiguity and complexity – 
because “unclear rules permit self-serving interpretations”224  – as well as in 
environments where the impact of the undesirable behavior is far removed 
from the actor in question.225  Decisions about financial stability are already 
plagued by issues of complexity and causation, and the calculus is likely to 
become even more complicated and attenuated as algorithms become 
increasingly responsible for financial decision making.  Furthermore, it will 
be harder to convey the real world impact of decision making to the humans 
working in the financial industry if their decisions are further intermediated 
by complex algorithmic decision-makers.  Attempts that are afoot to 
discipline financial risk-taking using virtuous cultural and social norms are 
therefore likely to be undercut by increased reliance on algorithms.  Where 
algorithms are capable of machine learning, if they are programmed to learn 
from the decisions of individuals who do not prioritize financial stability 
(perhaps because of ethical fading and moral licensing effects resulting from 
220 Daniel A. Effron & Paul Conway, When Virtue Leads to Villainy: Advances in Research 
on Moral Self-Licensing, 4 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=92587652) 
221 Id. at 5. 
222 Id. at 6. 
223 In a recent paper exploring the relevance of psychological findings for compliance in 
financial institutions, the FCA situated this phenomenon of moral licensing in the financial 
regulatory context by giving the example of the pre-Crisis FSA’s practice of vetting 
individual financial employees to determine their fitness and propriety to perform their 
roles.  In hindsight, the FCA noted that “it is likely that the FSA taking on responsibility for 
vetting staff ethics gave the impression that firms did not have to make such considerations 
themselves, leading to a reduction in the internal incentives that could have restrained rule 
breaking.”  FCA, Behaviour and Compliance in Organisations, FCA Occasional Paper 24, 
25 (Dec. 2016). 
224 Id. at 22. 
225 Id. at 23 “In wholesale markets the negative consequences of rule breaking may appear 
to be numbers on a screen, even though they can have large impacts on end consumers.” 
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increased reliance on algorithms), then this will exacerbate cultural 
disregard for financial stability in a vicious cycle. For example, a machine 
learning algorithm might learn from humans that it should consistently 
“nudge” customers into financial products and services that generate higher 
margins for the algorithm’s proprietor by obscuring the true costs and risks 
of a product, potentially contributing to a bubble.226 
Before concluding this discussion, it should be acknowledged that I 
have made the assumption throughout that algorithms are incapable of 
things like empathy, shame and embarrassment that can work to enforce 
human compliance with cultural and social norms.  Although it is currently a 
subject of hot philosophical and technological debate whether artificial 
intelligence may someday become capable of empathy,227 this debate is well 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Here, it suffices to say that although 
algorithms are already learning to mimic certain aspects of human 
empathy,228 it seems likely the finance industry’s increasing reliance on 
algorithmic processing power will far outpace the development of any 
genuine algorithmic empathy, circumscribing the impact of regulatory 
efforts to improve industry culture. 
E. Other Concerns Regarding Algorithms and Regulatory Efficacy 
Many of the financial stability concerns raised in the prior Section 
are simply not susceptible to solution by private sector means.  It is just not 
possible to program an algorithm to “promote finance stability”:229 even an 
unusually altruistic creator of an algorithm would face limitations on their 
ability to avoid systemic risk.230 While a programmer can thoroughly check 
their algorithms and data sets for bugs and take the possibility of tail risks 
seriously, their appreciation of possible tail risks would be limited without 
data about the functioning of other market participants.231  Financial stability 
regulators have both mandates and data to enable them to gather such 
information, and use it to make determinations about emerging systemic 
risks and how to deal with them – they therefore have an important role to 
226 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1277; 1290 (2017). 
227 Christopher Lum, Artificial Empathy: The Next Frontier, ASIAN SCIENTIST (Jul. 17, 
2017) (available at https://www.asianscientist.com/2017/07/features/aswp2017-artificial-
empathy/). 
228 Natasha Lomas, Can An Algorithm Be Empathetic? UK Startup EI Technologies is 
Building Software That’s Sensitive to Tone of Voice, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 4, 2013) 
(available at https://techcrunch.com/2013/08/04/empathy/). 
229 At present, technology limits a programmer’s ability to tie computer logic to the 
achievement of amorphous policy goals. Kroll et al., supra Note 125 at 646.  
230 In reality, because programmers of financial algorithms (and their employers) cannot 
appropriate the benefits of financial stability to themselves, there are abundant incentives to 
ignore systemic risks, and indeed to rush an algorithm to market without fully testing it in 
order to gain a competitive advantage. Awrey, supra Note 113 at 263.
231 Chris Brummer, Disruptive Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1043 
(2015). 
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play in addressing the increasing automation of financial services.232  
However, innovation in financial algorithms will undoubtedly make their 
jobs more challenging.233 
Financial regulators are used to supervising humans with a business 
and financial background; although financial firms have long used computer 
models to help manage risks, the output of those models could be construed 
as a recommendation that was ultimately acted upon by a human being.  The 
increasing automation of decision-making in the financial industry 
represents a shift that raises challenging questions about supervision, 
liability and enforcement for regulators.234  In terms of supervision, past 
experience in supervising financial institution compliance functions may no 
longer give much guidance to the next generation of regulators, to the extent 
that compliance systems will increasingly have to be varied to oversee 
decision-making by algorithms rather than humans.235  In a similar vein, 
regulatory judgments about the quality of management will have to be 
adjusted to take into account the challenges that non-technical directors and 
senior managers will face in overseeing the technological operations of their 
firms.236  
Enforcement strategies will also be affected by the increasing 
automation of finance.  There are already enormous difficulties in using 
sanctions to deter harmful destabilizing behaviors by humans working in the 
financial industry, largely because of the difficulties in establishing intent 
and causation sufficient to punish a particular individual.237  Policing 
destabilizing behaviors becomes even more abstracted if the judgment calls 
are not even being made by humans, but instead by an algorithm 
programmed by humans (or – even more abstracted – by an algorithm 
capable of machine learning).238  Regulatory attention will naturally shift to 
232 “Systemic risk regulation is an example where regulators cannot look to private  
regulatory strategies. Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of 
identifying how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system less stable.” 
Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1941 (2012).  
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234 See, for example, Chiu, Supra Note 68 at 92.  For a discussion of algorithms, artificial 
intelligence and liability in other contexts, see: Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics 
in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217 (2017); Vladeck, supra Note 21.   
235 European Banking Authority, supra Note 181 at 28.  If compliance personnel are not 
able to communicate what they need in terms that a computer programmer would 
understand, and skilled programmers lack sufficient understanding of financial risk-
management and legal requirements to spearhead such an effort themselves, then the 
compliance function will also be compromised.  Bamberger, supra Note 27 at 708. 
236 Glocer, supra Note 211; FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 34. 
237 Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 861, 
909-10 (2015). 
238 Vladeck observes that “society will need to consider whether existing liability rules will 
be up to the task of assigning responsibility for any wrongful acts [that fully autonomous 
machines] commit.” Vladeck, supra Note 21 at 121.  He has even raised the intriguing 
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the financial institution employees who design and train the algorithms, but 
financial stability regulators have little experience in dealing with computer 
programmers and data scientists, and this is likely be a challenging 
transition.  Questions also abound about the liability of financial institutions 
when the harm can be traced to technology developed by a third party 
vendor.239  In some instances, it may not even be possible to discern the 
person (or persons) responsible for a particular algorithm. A smart contract 
embedded in a financial asset, for example, could be created and maintained 
by a loosely connected group of anonymous programmers with no well-
delineated legal relationship to each other, or the asset.240  
Increased automation of finance may also undermine 
macroprudential regulatory strategies adopted in the wake of the Financial 
Crisis to promote financial stability.  While there are different ways of 
categorizing this “macroprudential toolkit”, it certainly includes regulatory 
capital requirements, liquidity requirements and stress tests, amongst other 
things.241  These tools will struggle with autonomous algorithmic finance.  
For example, whole new classes of “smart assets” can be created out of 
whole cloth by anyone with computer programming knowledge – there is no 
real limiting factor on the supply of these assets, which exponentially 
multiplies their potential risks.242  There will be considerable uncertainty 
about how to assess the risks associated with those assets, and thus about the 
levels of regulatory capital and liquid assets that an institution with exposure 
to those assets should be required to maintain.243 Even the regulatory capital 
and liquidity requirements applied to more traditional asset classes may turn 
out to be miscalibrated, as a result of unappreciated correlations amongst 
possibility of conferring legal personhood on autonomous intelligent machines to allow 
them to be held liable for their decision-making.  Id. at 150. 
239 See FSB AI Report, supra Note 7 at 26. 
240 Marcel T. Rosner & Andrew Kang, Understanding and Regulating Twenty-First 
Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study, 114 MICH. L. REV. 649, 663 (2016). 
241 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition, Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation 
(May 5, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke 20110505a.pdf). These tools 
seek to strengthen the financial system as a whole by controlling defaults and credit 
crunches and reducing the risk of fire sales. Anil K. Kashyap, Richard Berner and Charles 
A.E. Goodhart, The Macroprudential Toolkit, 59 IMF ECONOMIC REV. 145, 146 (2011). 
242 Omarova notes that cryptoassets are “(a) untethered from, and thus unconstrained by, 
any productive activity in the real economy and (b) tradable in potentially infinitely 
scalable virtual markets.” Omarova, supra Note 56 at [7]. 
243 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international standard setter that 
develops prudential rules relating to banks’ exposure to different asset classes, is 
considering whether to “whether to formally clarify the prudential treatment of crypto-
assets across the set of risk categories.” Financial Stability Board, CRYPTO-ASSETS: 
REPORT TO THE G20 ON WORK BY THE FSB AND STANDARD-SETTING 
BODIES, 7 (Jul. 16, 2018) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P160718-
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asset classes arising from more uniform algorithmic financial decision-
making models.  If these requirements are miscalibrated, then that could 
increase the likelihood that financial institutions are insufficiently cushioned 
against a financial shock, with the result that if that shock were to occur, 
they would be forced to engage in asset fire sales that depress asset prices 
system-wide – or become insolvent.  
Macroprudential regulation also requires ongoing monitoring of the 
financial system for evolving risks to stability;244 the complexity and speed 
of algorithmic transacting will make this already confounding task even 
more challenging.  The predictive capacity of stress tests, for example, may 
be undermined because hypothetical stress test scenarios created without the 
benefit of experience of an automated financial system failure may not tell 
regulators much about how the system will fare when something goes awry 
in the future.  If something does go wrong, the increasingly automated 
nature of finance may also undermine the ability of regulators to mitigate 
panic by disrupting the mechanisms by which a shock is transmitted through 
the system.245  Emergency measures like circuit breakers, for example, may 
not be able to be deployed in time to force market participants to take a 
collective pause and make a more rational assessment of market prices and 
risks.246  Regulators and central banks have sometimes used 
communications strategies to restore confidence and prevent panic selling in 
the past,247 but it is unclear how strategies designed to appeal to human 
sentiment will be interpreted by algorithms.  It is even unclear how 
algorithms will respond to more concrete actions like bail-outs or guarantee 
schemes: will they be programmed to recognize and respond favorably to 
such emergency intervention?248 While politically unpalatable, many believe 
that such measures are sometimes necessary to prevent problems in the 
financial system from pushing the economy into a depression249 – the rise of 
driverless finance may limit the efficacy of future bailouts as a method of 
quelling market panics, however.  As they are increasingly forced to reckon 
with “driverless finance”, financial stability regulators will find themselves 
244 Bernanke, supra Note 241. 
245 Anabtawi & Schwarcz have observed that ex post financial stability measures tend to 
take the form of providing financial safety nets (whether by providing financial support to a 
firm or purchasing assets to support market pricing), and disrupting the mechanisms by 
which risks are transmitted through the system.  Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 75, 77 (2013). 
246 For a discussion of circuit breakers, see Id. at 117-118.  
247 Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 15, 33 (2014).  
248 For a discussion of how such mechanisms have been deployed to restore confidence in 
assets and stabilize the financial system, see Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe 
Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 399-404 (2016).  
249 See, for example, Martin Neil Bally & Douglas J. Elliott, Avoid Depression, Don’t Ban 
Bailout, BROOKINGS (May 12, 2010). 
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in the unenviable position of having to reassess much of what they know 
about how the financial markets function.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY POLICY 
Regulators face significant challenges as they approach nascent 
technologies, which are often shrouded in Knightian uncertainty250 (in the 
sense that the potential risks associated with such technologies and their 
probabilities are unknown, and therefore rational assessments of risks 
cannot be calculated).251  There is always the concern that early regulation 
will stifle beneficial innovation, but waiting for affirmative proof of a 
technology’s risks before addressing them can be very costly for society – in 
some contexts, such costs can be catastrophic and irreversible.252  
Furthermore, if “the public’s interest [remains] entirely unrepresented 
during the industry’s formative period”,253 regulators will face challenges in 
altering the workings of a technology once it is operational.254 This Article 
has therefore argued that, in the context of increasingly automated 
algorithmic finance, early regulatory intervention is vitally important – 
notwithstanding limitations on regulators’ ability to precisely identify and 
quantify the potential impacts of such risks, and notwithstanding benefits 
that will potentially be foregone.255  
In terms of foregone benefits, most of the excitement about 
algorithm-driven business models like marketplace lending and robo-
investing relates is driven by the promise of increasingly efficient and 
inclusive financial services.256  If financial stability regulation attempts to 
curb increasingly autonomous algorithms, then that could restrict the 
development of, or access to, products and services that might ultimately 
benefit individual consumers and investors.257  However, as Pasquale has 
250 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841, 1848 (2011). 
251 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921)  
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254 See Notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
255 Pasquale has made a similar argument that policymakers should not “abandon long-
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that have yet to be proven.”  Pasquale, supra Note 136 at 16. 
256 Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at Money 
20/20, Las Vegas, NV (Oct. 23, 2016) (available at 
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richard-cordray-money-2020/ ). 
257 In a previous article, I raised the possibility that in some circumstances “fintech’s 
promise of increased access to financial services might seem less like a boon, and more like 
a way to increase rents at the expense of an expanding group of uninformed consumers.” 
Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ (2019).  In a similar vein, 
we should remain wary of the possibility that the “democratization” of financial services 
through robo-investing and marketplace lending is being pursued in order to develop large 
monetizable data sets for machine learning, with little regard for consumer protection or 
financial stability. 
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insightfully noted, “we should be wary about the ability of technology alone 
to solve much larger social problems of financial inclusion, opportunity, and 
fair, non-discriminatory credit provision.”258  Restricting technological 
development will not doom these public policy goals – it will simply require 
other (potentially more targeted and deliberate) approaches to achieving 
them.  Furthermore, I have previously argued that when the regulatory goals 
of financial stability, investor/consumer protection and efficiency conflict, 
“financial stability is the normative regulatory goal designed to benefit the 
broadest group of people” and should be the “apex” concern.259  This 
Section therefore provides some concrete recommendations for 
precautionary action with respect to algorithmic finance, in light of the 
potential risks highlighted in the previous Section. 
A precautionary approach to reviewing a technology considers the 
process by which it is created, instead of restricting regulatory oversight to 
the finished product.260  One way in which such process can be regulated is 
by requiring preapproval from a governmental authority before a technology 
can be marketed;261 in an earlier article, I outlined the benefits of and 
mechanics for implementing a precautionary preapproval process for new 
financial products. To summarize briefly, such a process would force an 
innovator “to approach the financial regulator with all the relevant 
information about its new product, rather than the regulator scrambling to 
keep up with the innovation process”.262 As a precondition to approval, the 
regulator could require the innovator to “conduct stress tests and consider 
the systemic consequences of any new financial product and present their 
findings to the regulator”.263  While financial products can never be 
pronounced conclusively safe,264 they could be required to meet certain 
standards before being made available to the financial markets. 
Because financial market participants “think and plan strategically, 
and then make decisions based on their plans”, the predictive capacity of 
pre-market testing of financial products will always be more limited than 
similar testing of physical systems,265 but a preapproval process is still 
258 Pasquale, supra Note 136 at 18. 
259 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715, 731 
(2018).  Gordon has also argued that stability should be the “apex goal” of financial 
regulation. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Dynamic Precaution’ in Maintaining Financial 
Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in O’Halloran & Groll (eds) TEN YEARS AFTER 
THE CRASH (forthcoming). 
260 Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 10. 
261 Tutt has called for the establishment of an FDA to pre-approve machine learning 
algorithms more generally – this Article restricts its focus to algorithms performing 
financial functions. Tutt, supra Note 6. 
262 Allen, supra Note 5 at 222. 
263 Id. at 223. 
264 Id. at 195-6. 
265 Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 2236, 2265 (2014). 
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valuable.  Not only does a preapproval regime shift some of the costs of 
testing the innovation to the innovator, if the innovator “knows that it will 
need to explain or justify a product to a regulator, but does not think it will 
be able do so because the product is overly complicated or poses significant 
systemic risk, [it] may abandon or simplify the product without any 
regulatory instruction”.266  Such an outcome would be beneficial because it 
would put some bounds on increasing complexity, which can only really be 
constrained by preventing new products from entering the financial 
system.267  A preapproval regime could similarly constrain the emergence of 
new financial technologies that might otherwise multiply the amount of risk 
in the financial system.268 Such a process also allows for dialogue between 
industry and regulators, which can help educate regulators on new 
technologies.269  In an ideal world, such dialogue would also help forge a 
less adversarial and more cooperative partnership between regulator and 
industry, where all parties recognize that financial stability is a mutually 
beneficial outcome and work cooperatively towards achieving it.270  
As part of a preapproval process, regulators could require that certain 
capabilities be built into financial algorithms before they are approved.  For 
example, to alleviate concerns about a smart asset causing harm by 
executing too quickly in erroneous circumstances,271 regulators could 
require that some form of circuit breaker be programmed into it, enabling a 
third-party arbitrator and/or regulator to pause the smart contract’s self-
execution in emergency circumstances.272  Abstracting from the algorithm 
itself, regulators may wish to regulate the construction of the distributed 
ledgers on which smart contracts are hosted.  For example, there could be 
requirements that smart assets only be hosted on centralized, permissioned 
distributed ledgers so that there is an established formal cohort of validators 
that can be relied upon to quickly correct erroneous transactions when 
necessary.273   
266 Allen, supra Note 5 at 224. 
267 Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 66 (2012) 
268 Id. at 227-228. Omarova notes that concerns about the ability of new financial products 
to multiply risk in the financial system are especially pronounced in the fintech context, 
where “fintech technology can be, and is, used to synthesize tradable financial assets 
effectively out of thin air.”  Omarova, supra Note 56 at [42].   
269 Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. [52] (2019). 
270 Id. 
271 See Notes 154-159 and accompanying text.   
272 The PDPC has noted that in “safety-critical systems, organizations should ensure that a 
person be allowed to assume control.” Singapore PDPC, supra Note 282 at 9. In a related 
context, Van Loo has queried whether some kind of slow-down mechanism needs to be 
programmed into digital personal assistants like Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa.  Rory 
Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 48 (2019) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308524).   
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One might initially assume that regulators would need to access an 
algorithm’s source code in order to test compliance with such requirements 
and pre-approve a financial algorithm, but this might not ultimately be a 
fruitful exercise (and requiring it would provoke a potentially unnecessary 
political fight with the financial industry – many financial algorithms are 
guarded “just as Coca-Cola guards its beverage formula”).274  Kroll et al. 
note that “inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a 
computer program will behave” in a given situation,275 and that even very 
simple bugs can evade the scrutiny of their expert programmers276 (outside 
regulators would have even greater difficulty in deciphering and predicting 
the operation of algorithmic source code).277  But regulators do not need 
source code to determine whether required features have been included; they 
can simply run an algorithm in testing mode and see how it responds.  
Regulators could also compel the programmer of a simpler predictive 
algorithm to explain its workings to regulators more generally (including the 
factors that the algorithm was programmed to consider, and how they were 
weighted).  Such explanation will be valuable both in terms of highlighting 
risks that the algorithm may pose for the institution deploying it, as well as 
contributing to regulators’ understanding of systemic concerns.  If a problem 
is identified as part of this process, errors in predictive algorithms tend to be 
– relatively – easy to fix.278
Machine learning algorithms present a more challenging case, 
because of the inability of programmers to explain their workings279 or teach 
them not to repeat a previous mistake.280  Given the present uncertainty 
regarding the operation of this technology, regulators may wish to start with 
a high-level, principles-based regulatory approach that requires financial 
firms developing machine learning capabilities to ensure that the algorithms 
be as predictable and explainable as the technology allows.281  For example, 
algorithms could be programmed to be able to explain their own decision-
274 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1291 (2017). The 
CFTC tried unsuccessfully to obtain access to high frequency traders’ source code. Hilary J. 
Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. Corp. L. 715, 763 (2018). 
275 Kroll et al., supra Note 125 at 638. 
276 Id. at 647. 
277 “For those on the outside seeking to hold algorithms to account, the challenge of 
legibility is even greater”. Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 9. 
278 “If something goes wrong, the programmer can go back through the program’s 
instructions to find out why the error occurred and correct it.”  Tutt, supra Note 6 at 93. 
279 Kroll et al., supra Note 125 at 638. 
280 Tutt, supra Note 6 at 89; Stilgoe, supra Note 20 at 11. 
281 For a discussion of the utility of principles-based regimes in regulating unfamiliar 
technologies, see Chris Brummer and Daniel Gorfine, Fintech: Building a 21st-Century 
Regulator’s Toolkit, 7 (Oct. 2014) (available at 
http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/3.14-FinTech-Reg-
Toolkit-NEW.pdf). For further discussion of the problems of predictability and 
explainability, see Tutt, supra Note 6 at 101. 
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making, and the data considered in reaching that decision.282  To help 
mitigate the unpredictability of the operation of a machine learning 
algorithm during a tail event, steps could be taken to ensure that these 
algorithms learn something of the possibility of such events.  Ultimately, 
though, industry participants would have flexibility in a principles-based 
regime as to how they addressed the articulated regulatory goals – ideally, 
such an approach would encourage innovation in, and collaboration with 
regulators on, the management of systemic risks at a time when there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding how to approach machine learning.283  
As the technology becomes better understood and best practices emerge 
over time, however, those best practices could be enshrined in formal rules, 
limiting the deregulatory potential that has been observed in some other 
principles-based regimes.284   
There are a variety of different approaches that can be taken to 
training machine learning algorithms.  One strategy that has been adopted to 
avoid “overfitting” (a problem where the model becomes “too specialized or 
specific to the data used for training”) is for algorithms to be programmed to 
make random guesses and learn from the outcomes.285  Unfortunately, in a 
tightly coupled and reflexive system like the financial system, the outcomes 
of random guesses in normal times will not be predictive of the 
consequences of doing the same thing in a time of stress.  A different 
strategy will be needed if we want financial algorithms to learn that their 
responses to tail events may have destructive potential, and modify them 
accordingly.  In the autonomous vehicle context, machine learning 
algorithms use what is known as “fleet learning” to develop an 
understanding of low-probability scenarios and how to deal with them.286  
An equivalent process to fleet learning would not be effective in training 
financial algorithms about how to react in crisis situations, though, because 
low-probability events in the financial system do not happen randomly over 
a long period of time (which would allow for incremental learning).  
Instead, such events tend to happen all at once (sometimes decades after the 
last significant crisis), leaving the algorithms no time to learn how to 
282 Singapore Personal Data Protection Commission, A PROPOSED MODEL 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FRAMEWORK, 13 (Jan. 2019) (available at 
https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Resource-for-Organisation/AI/A-
Proposed-Model-AI-Governance-Framework-January-2019.pdf). “[T]here is reason to 
believe that algorithm designers can design machine-learning algorithms with attention to 
ensuring explainability.” Tutt, supra Note 6 at 109. 
283 “A principles-based regime gives regulatory agencies an umbrella framework under 
which to deploy informal regulatory strategies to deal more flexibly with new industry 
practices as they arise.” Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ 
(2019). 
284 “[D]evolution of responsibility to industry – in the absence of the firm boundaries and 
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react.287  In order to mitigate systemic risk, financial algorithms capable of 
machine learning may therefore need to be exposed to hypothetical 
scenarios that emphasize worst-case scenarios, and demonstrate the 
consequences of correlated responses to such events. 
Study of the stress testing hypotheticals that are currently used in the 
financial industry may yield insights on how to perform feature selection for 
financial algorithms capable of machine learning,288 but extant financial 
stress testing methodologies certainly will need to be adapted for this 
purpose.  Often, stress testing relies on historical data that may not be 
predictive of future stress scenarios involving more automated algorithmic 
decision-making.289  Also, the stress tests that are currently deployed tend to 
be focused on a particular outcome290 – macroprudential stress tests, for 
example, are designed to determine whether a financial institution has 
sufficient capital to withstand a systemic shock.291  When training a machine 
learning algorithm, capitalization of the firm deploying the algorithm would 
not always be the main focus – often, the interaction of the algorithm with 
other algorithms in the financial system will be more important.  The 
hypothetical scenarios used should therefore not be engineered towards 
testing for a particular outcome, but instead should be designed to find out 
“what would happen if …”, in order to train algorithms to anticipate and 
mitigate the systemic repercussions of their decisions.  Weber has referred 
to this type of approach to stress tests as “deliberation-oriented”; he 
describes such an approach as “privileg[ing] dynamic scenarios; draw[ing] 
from business operations culture; rel[ying] on imagination; consider[ing] the 
interactivity of tested variables; remain[ing] open to uncertainty”.292  
The difficulty and cost of developing such scenarios should not be 
understated.  This is something that only the largest financial institutions 
287 Crawford observes that the rarity of such events makes it difficult to practice and receive 
feedback on reactions. John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of 
(In)Experience and Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111, 160 (2015). 
288 “As part of the regulatory toolkit, macro stress tests should contain such (systemic risk) 
externalities by ensuring that the financial sector is sufficiently capitalized to continue 
financial intermediation in a severe economic downturn. To simulate a severe economic 
downturn, regulators define a hypothetical stress scenario by specifying shocks to different 
macroeconomic and financial variables. The adverse scenario is translated into losses to 
assets on the balance sheet of banks using models that capture the sensitivity of banks’ 
exposures to the stress scenario. These losses are assumed to be first borne by equity 
capital. The required capitalization of a bank is assessed using measures (the capital ratios) 
of the financial performance of the bank after application of the stress test model.” Viral 
Acharya et al., Testing Macroprudential Stress Tests: The Risk of Regulatory Risk Weights, 
65 J. MON. ECON. 36, 36 (2014). 
289 See Weber, supra Note 265 at 2240 for a discussion of the historical focus of many 
stress testing methodologies. 
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would be capable of doing in-house – and it is not clear that it would be 
desirable for them do so from a public policy perspective.293  (If a firm does 
create its own hypothetical training scenarios, regulators at the very least 
should require records and explanations of the scenarios used).294  For most 
market participants, though, the regulator will need to provide some form of 
hypothetical scenario to be used as training data.  Regulators could devise 
such scenarios by requiring the proprietors of certain financial algorithms to 
have their algorithms participate in “war games”, which are coordinated 
simulations designed to “inspire creative problem solving and to spur [them] 
to think about unthinkable outcomes”.295  Participation in such war games 
could also function as a training exercise for the algorithms – a chance to 
practice reacting to tail events, and receive feedback on the outcome of their 
decisions in a theoretically stressed context.296  By training all machine 
learning algorithms with the same hypothetical scenarios, attempts to 
encourage these algorithms to take into account the possibility of 
destabilizing correlated behavior may ultimately serve to further correlate 
the behavior of the algorithms.  To mitigate this, the war games conducted 
by regulators should focus on the reflexivity of algorithmic interactions 
(meaning that when algorithms learn to react to the scenarios they have been 
exposed to, the operation of the scenario itself becomes altered).297  Regular 
adjustments to the scenarios should also be made to reflect changed 
circumstances and understandings about sources of risks, and the channels 
through which such risks can be transmitted through the system.298 
While it is critically important that regulators involve themselves in 
the process by which financial algorithms (and the ledgers on which they are 
hosted) are created, there is also a place for regulatory engagement with 
algorithms after they become operational.  Supervision efforts will give 
regulators opportunities to participate in the ongoing testing and training of 
algorithms, as well as opportunities to assess institutional capacity to 
293 Such an approach could raise similar concerns as the internal models approach to capital 
regulation: “the Basel II Accord allowed certain large financial institutions to set their own 
regulatory capital levels according to their proprietary risk models…financial institutions 
used these models to lower their capital requirements.” Gerding, supra Note 136 at 375.  
294 Singapore PDPC, supra Note 282 at 11; 14. 
295 Weber, supra Note 265 at 2264.  To some extent, these wargames could be simulated 
using agent-based modeling on computers – while the predictive capacity of such models 
has been critiqued for making heterogeneous assumptions about the behavior of market 
participants, such heterogeneous assumptions may become increasingly appropriate as more 
and more decision-making is delegated to algorithms.  Where behavior is relatively 
predictable, “complexity arises from the interaction of agents, not from the structure of the 
agents’ individual decision-making rules”.  Crawford, supra Note 287 at 166. 
296 Crawford, supra Note 287 at 160. 
297 For a discussion of reflexivity, see Awrey, supra Note 113 at 257-8; Crawford, supra 
Note 287 at 162. 
298 For a discussion of the current understanding of risk transmission channels, see 
Kashyap, Berner and Goodhart, supra Note 241. 
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manage the operational risks associated with cyberthreats and third-party 
vendors.299  
Regulatory supervision also considers an institution’s governance 
and culture.300  In the first ever Proposed Model Artificial Intelligence 
Governance Framework, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Commission 
has recommended some internal governance structures and measures to 
assist organizations in overseeing their own use of artificial intelligence:301 
these could inform financial regulatory supervision of financial institutions 
relying on machine learning algorithms.  The PDPC’s framework stresses 
the importance of an enterprise risk management structure that interrogates 
the selection and continued use of any machine learning model, with a view 
to remediation if something goes wrong, and with a particular focus on 
errors and bias in the training data used.302  It also recommends that “ethical 
considerations [associated with artificial intelligence] can be introduced as 
corporate values and managed through ethics review boards or similar 
structures”:303 importantly, the PDPC recognizes that sometimes the societal 
risks associated with a particular machine learning application will be 
sufficiently great that a firm should not use it at all.304  In this vein, 
regulators should seek to promote deliberative and ethical use of computer 
modeling as part of the broader cultural initiatives discussed in Section 
IV.D, aiming to disrupt some of the problematic aspects of algorithmic
deference and “automation bias”.305 
Unfortunately, the prophylactic regulation recommended by this 
Article is unlikely to be completely successful in preventing financial 
algorithms from causing systemic problems.  Regulators will need to be able 
to audit significant algorithmic failures after the fact (both for enforcement 
purposes, and to improve the quality of their ex ante regulation going 
forward).306  To facilitate future audits, regulators may want to mandate 
299 For a discussion of cyberthreats, see Kristin N. Johnson, Cyber Risks: Emerging Risk 
Management Concerns for Financial Institutions, 50 GEORGIA L. REV. 131, 139 (2015).  
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Commissioner Kara Stein noted “The Flash Crash and other events in our markets 
demonstrate the need for CAT. Only through a consolidated audit trail can we truly know 
what is happening in our marketplace, with trading activity cascading across multiple 
trading venues and asset classes.  The linkages, complexity, and fragmentation of our 
markets outstrip the current ability to monitor, analyze, and interpret market events.  Only 
through CAT can we develop regulations that are truly driven by facts.  Only through CAT 
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from the outset measures to ensure that a machine learning algorithm is 
“traceable”, meaning that “its decision-making processes are documented in 
an easily understandable way”.307 Possible options include requiring “an 
audit trail to document the decision-making process”, “implementing a 
black box recorder that captures all input data streams” and mandating data 
storage requirements.308  Compliance with such measures may prove very 
expensive for firms, and so as a practical matter, regulators may ultimately 
need to scale their application to the size and operations of the regulated 
firm, weighing the likelihood of systemic harm against the cost of 
compliance.309 
Thus far, this Section has presumed regulatory jurisdiction over the 
programmers of financial algorithms (in other words, this Section has so far 
presumed that each programmer works for a financial institution that is 
regulated by a regulator with a financial stability mandate).  However, there 
are financial institutions that are not regulated by any financial stability 
regulator,310 as well as financial institutions that elude regulatory oversight 
entirely by working in a jurisdiction or providing a service that is not 
covered by any regulatory regime.311  Non-financial firms with significant 
technology operations and data resources (sometimes referred to as the 
“techfins”, this group includes firms like Google and Amazon) are also 
largely unsupervised by financial regulators, notwithstanding that some of 
them are starting to provide types of financial services.312  Finally, a 
programmer may not even be connected with any institution at all, as is 
currently the case with many of the creators of tokens. Given these 
limitations, this Section will finish by considering how financial stability 
regulators can effect change indirectly, through the financial institutions that 
they do oversee.   
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Regulated financial institutions have such a significant presence in 
the financial markets that regulatory requirements that delineate what those 
institutions can invest in may ultimately have a helpful standard-setting 
function for all financial assets, even those traded outside of the regulated 
financial sector.  Furthermore, financial institutions are well-recognized 
conduits (both in terms of their web of contracts with other institutions and 
their leverage-fueled propensity to sell assets at fire sale prices) for 
transmitting financial shocks to other market participants, allowing such 
shocks to metastasize into a financial crisis.313  To the extent that financial 
institutions do not have direct or indirect exposure to an asset class, the 
ability of a problem with that asset class to generate instability is 
circumscribed (even though it is still possible that problems with a class of 
smart assets that is widely traded outside of regulated financial institutions 
could have an impact on the proper functioning of the financial system).314  
Regulators could therefore mitigate systemic risk by discouraging financial 
institutions from investing (directly, or indirectly through mechanisms like 
derivatives) in tokens or other smart assets unless such assets meet certain 
established criteria, and are hosted on distributed ledgers that similarly meet 
established criteria.315  Such discouragement could take the form of 
significant regulatory capital and/or liquidity requirements for non-
compliant smart assets, for example.316 
Before concluding, this Article will offer a brief word on resource 
constraints.  Many of the recommendations made in this Section could only 
be implemented if financial stability regulators are sufficiently computer 
literate to interface effectively with computer algorithms, and as machine 
learning becomes more prominent, data science expertise will also become a 
vital regulatory skill set.  Hiring personnel with such expertise will no doubt 
be expensive, and teething pains are to be expected as personnel with this 
type of experience integrate into the (arguably somewhat staid) culture of 
financial regulatory agencies.  However, if one accepts this Article’s 
premise that a precautionary approach to regulating increasingly 
autonomous financial algorithms is necessary, such expansion of regulatory 
capabilities should begin immediately, with necessary funding support from 
the relevant governmental bodies.317 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Driverless cars and driverless finance are both likely to perform well 
– perhaps even better than when a human is in control – most of the time.
Both, however, are likely to react in unpredictable and potentially dangerous 
ways when confronted with unanticipated low-probability events.  
Notwithstanding this similarity, regulatory attitudes towards these two types 
of technologies have been very different so far: regulatory policy regarding 
autonomous vehicles has had a much more precautionary bent than the 
regulation of automated financial decision-making.  This Article has argued 
that, given the gravity of social harm that can flow from financial crises, 
policymakers need to turn their attention to finance’s (admittedly less 
salient) potential harms, and that the processes by which financial 
algorithms are being developed should come under regulatory scrutiny.  
Such efforts are time critical – we may soon reach an inflection point after 
which attempts by regulators to influence the development of the relevant 
technology will be ineffective.   
This Article will finish on a note of optimism, however. Human 
beings don’t have a particularly good track record of avoiding financial 
crises, as Reinhart & Rogoff’s book “This Time is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly” amply demonstrates.318  The development of 
autonomous finance could ultimately result in a financial system that is 
more resilient than the one we currently have.319  This will not be achieved 
through deregulation, however, but through partnerships between regulators 
and programmers that render financial algorithms more mindful of, and 
more resilient to, systemic impacts.  A forum for this type of partnership is 
already being trialed on a small scale in many countries in the form of the 
“regulatory sandbox”.320  The changes being wrought to the financial 
industry by the rise of driverless finance may generate other opportunities to 
engineer a collaborative relationship between financial regulators and 
industry participants, allowing for new financial technologies to be 
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harnessed at the programming stage in a public-private partnership to 
improve financial stability.321  
321 For a thorough exploration of the possibilities and preconditions for a financial stability-
minded public-private partnership, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of 
Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011). 
